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ABSTRACT

While the literature examining university engagement in patenting and technology transfer is quite
developed, commentators largely have overlooked university involvement in patent litigation. This
article focuses on one aspect of that involvement-initiation of patent infringement litigation-by
providing a quantitative and textual analysis of patent infringement actions initiated by universities
from 2009 through 2010. Suing for-profit actors for money may seem antithetical to the mission of
not-for-profit universities, but in fact universities filed over fifty such cases in the studied time
period. Examination of these cases reveals a remarkable similarity between the litigation behavior
of universities and for-profit actors, as well as complex and varied relationships between
universities, their licensees, and research foundations closely affiliated with universities. These
findings situate within a larger conversation over the commercial, political, and social implications of
science, education, and innovation and suggest that further attention to the activity is warranted,
given the substantial public investments in both public and private higher education that result in
patentable inventions.
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UNIVERSITY INITIATION OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
JACOB H. ROOKSBY*

I. INTRODUCTION

Diminishing state support for higher education has fueled universities' everexpanding search for revenues to support their missions.' Against this backdrop, the
benefits of university 2 engagement in patenting and technology transfer look
appealing for many reasons. 3 Patenting can raise the prestige of faculty inventors
and their institutions while technology transfer-i.e., "the transfer of the results of
basic and applied research to the design, development, production, and
commercialization of new or improved products, services, or processes" 4-can provide

*C Jacob H. Rooksby 2011.

Jacob H. Rooksby litigated intellectual property disputes with

McGuireWoods LLP from 2007-2010. He received his J.D. and M.Ed. in the social foundations of
education from the University of Virginia, where he is currently a doctoral student in higher
education. Special thanks to Brian Pusser and Madelyn Wessel for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article and to Kent Olson for his invaluable research assistance. Additional
thanks to Westlaw and the Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse for providing academic
access to their databases. Standard disclaimers apply.

1 See generally BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., MISSION AND MONEY: UNDERSTANDING THE
UNIVERSITY 29-31 (2008) (calling higher education as an industry "revenue hungry" and noting that
public support of public institutions through state appropriations has been declining sharply); David
W. Breneman, Entrepreneurshipin Higher Education, in ARENAS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHERE
NONPROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS COMPETE 3 (Brian Pusser ed., 2005) (discussing the

impact of economic pressures on all sectors of higher education).
2 University is used throughout this article to mean any not-for-profit, public or private, postsecondary, degree-granting research institution in the United States that is engaged in patenting
and technology transfer. It is important to note, however, that not every institution that has
university in its name is engaged in patenting and technology transfer (e.g., Southern Virginia
University), just as not every institution engaged in patenting and technology transfer has

university in its name (e.g., Dartmouth College). For purposes of this article, university affiliated
research and patent entities are included within the meaning of the term university unless
otherwise noted.
3Some view university involvement in these activities as nothing short of a revolution within
the academy. See generally JONATHAN R. COLE, THE GREAT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: ITS RISE TO
PREEMINENCE, ITS INDISPENSIBLE NATIONAL ROLE, AND WHY IT MUST BE PROTECTED (2009); Henry

Etzkowitz & Andrew Webster, Entrepreneurial Science:

The Second Academic Revolution, in

CAPITALIZING KNOWLEDGE: NEW INTERSECTIONS OF INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIA 21 (Henry Etzkowitz,

Andrew Webster & Peter Healey eds., State University of New York Press 1998) ("[T]he second
academic revolution is the translation of research findings into intellectual property, a marketable
commodity, and economic development.").
4 GARY W. MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE UNIVERSITY 5 (1990).

Some define

technology transfer more broadly to include publication, networking, teaching, student placement,
consulting, conferences, public meetings, and collaboration, all of which entail taking ideas
generated in universities and transferring them to industry. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ET AL.,
MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 16-17, 46 (Stephen A.

Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL]. This article
uses the more limited meaning as described above.
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much needed revenues to universities and beneficial products to consumers. 5 Many
university administrators have realized this, as noted by recent industry data on
university involvement in technology transfer. In fiscal year 2009 alone, universities
reaped $1.7 billion dollars in revenues from licensing patents, filed over 10,000 new
patent applications, were issued over 3,000 new patents, and helped create over 500
start-up companies. 6 In light of these figures, it is unsurprising that policymakers
increasingly view universities as engines of economic growth. 7
These activities are not without costs, however, both monetary and nonmonetary. A vast literature has developed that criticizes university engagement in
patenting and technology transfer on various grounds. 8 Largely absent from the
discussion, however, is any focused attention on university initiation of patent
infringement litigation, an assertive and multifaceted activity with important policy
considerations for higher education. Patent infringement litigation is an inherently
market-situated activity that involves high costs, high risks, and complex business
decisions at every turn. Given that universities are typically cash-strapped, risk
averse, and less focused on business dealings than for-profit actors, from a normative
perspective patent infringement litigation would seem to be an activity that
universities should seldom, if ever, initiate.
Yet likely for a variety reasons-and as research discussed in this article
reveals-they frequently do initiate it, often pursuing litigation strategies that mimic
the behaviors of for-profit actors. As one of the first focused studies of this
phenomenon, this article presents quantitative and textual findings from a search to
identify every patent infringement lawsuit and associated complaint filed by
universities in the two-year period from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010.
The findings provide fruitful information for scholars and university practitioners of
technology transfer, an interdisciplinary activity that often spans the fields of law,
business, medicine, engineering, and higher education, if not others. Findings

5See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and ProprietaryRights: Putting Patents in Their
Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 218 (2006); David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N.
Sampat & Arvids A. Ziedonis, The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An
Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL'Y 99, 103-04 (2001). Technology
transfer also directly and indirectly impacts local and regional economies in positive ways, through
added employment, new firm development, investment initiation, reinvestment in the university,
and regional spillovers and knowledge flows. See Robert A. Lowe & Suzanne K. Quick, Measuring
the Impact of University Technology Transfer: A Guide to Methodologies, Data Needs, and Sources,
19 INDUS. & HIGHER EDUC. 231, 233-36 (2005).
6 See Ass'n of Univ. Tech. Managers, Licensing Revenue and Patent Activity, 2009 Fiscal Year,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 17, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Table-Licensing-Revenueand/125729.
7See Etzkowitz & Webster, supra note 3, at 39 (arguing that the new social contract between
academia and society entails large-scale government support for academic research so long as it
plays a key role in the new economy); Donald S. Siegel & Phillip H. Phan, Analyzing the
Effectiveness of University Technology Transfer: Implications for EntrepreneurshipEducation, in 16
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 2 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).

AND ECONOMIC GROWTH,
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND

8 See infra Part IB. Many of these criticisms challenge universities' historic position as set
apart from society, as special bastions marked by "objectivity, impartiality, and aloofness from
commercial concerns." MATKIN, supra note 4, at 56.
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presented in the article also allow for deeper understanding of the growing adoption
by universities of for-profit business practices on the institutional level.
Part II of this article provides background on university engagement in
patenting and technology transfer, as well as common criticisms of these activities.
Part III identifies patent-related litigation, broadly defined, as an important cost of
university engagement in patenting and technology transfer. The various types of
patent-related court conflicts that universities may initiate or face are briefly
discussed in that section, which ends with a summary of the underdeveloped
literature on university initiation of patent infringement litigation. Part IV outlines
the methodology (and its limitations) used in identifying the lawsuits and complaints
discussed in Part V, which presents findings and discusses implications. Part VI
concludes.

II. HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF UNIVERSITY ENGAGEMENT IN PATENTING AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

A. History
University faculty have conducted scientific research for over a century, but
university involvement in patenting the fruits of scientific research is a more recent
phenomenon. While the date of the first patent owned by a university is unknown,
the first license of a university patent occurred in 1925, when the University of
Wisconsin-Madison created the nation's first technology transfer office ("TTO") and
exclusively licensed to Quaker Oats a patent on a process invented by a faculty
member for vitamin D irradiation. 9 As government turned to universities to assist
with defense initiatives during World War II, many universities-even ones not
heavily involved in patenting-established policies to clarify that faculty inventors
were obligated to assign their patent rights to the university, even as universities
sought to distance themselves from the activity. 10 As part of this distancing effort, a
non-profit intermediary organization called the Research Corporation managed the
licensing of most university patents well into the 1970s. 11 Although the number of

9 See JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 50 (2006); WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 1, at 156.
10
See DAVID C. MOWERY, RICHARD R. NELSON, BHAVEN N. SAMPAT & ARVIDS A. ZIEDONIS,
IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY BEFORE AND
AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 41-43 (2004) [hereinafter IVORY TOWER
INNOVATION]. Unsurprisingly-given their focus on agricultural and mechanical arts-land-grant
institutions were the first group of universities to become involved with patents. Id. at 38.
11Mowery et al., supra note 5, at 101; Gary Rhoades & Sheila Slaughter, Academic Capitalism
and the New Economy: Privatization as Shifting the Target of Public Subsidy in Higher Education,
in THE UNIVERSITY, STATE, AND MARKET: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE
AMERICAS 103, 110 (Robert A. Rhoads & Carlos Alberto Torres eds., 2006); IVORY TOWER
INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 39, 44, 58 (noting that the Research Corporation was administering
inventions for more than 200 institutions by 1970).
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TTOs would grow to twenty-five by 1980, most universities' patent activity was quite
modest before 1980.12
The leading explanation for why universities were not active in patenting during
this time period is that the federal government generally retained title to inventions
funded with federal dollars, or required that the results of the sponsored research
enter the public domain, unless other arrangements were made. 13 Each federal
agency had its own policy concerning whether a funding recipient could patent an
invention developed from that funding. 14 Only a small number of the thousands of
patents owned by the federal government were licensed to private industry prior to
1980,15 as "incentives to pursue commercialization and capacity to do so were
limited." 16 As a result, conventional wisdom held that American society was failing
to reap the benefits of a considerable amount of intellectual property effectively "lost"
in the morass of federal government. Partly in response to these concerns, Congress
changed the presumption of government ownership in 1980 with the passage of the
University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, 17 which came to be known as
the Bayh-Dole Act (the "Act") in honor of its bi-partisan sponsors, former Senator
Birch Bayh (D-IN) and former Senator Robert Dole (R-KS). 18 President Carter
signed the Act into law in December of 1980, and it took effect on July 1, 1981.19
The Act as originally passed provided that nonprofit and small busineSS20
recipients of federal research funds-both referred to as "contractors" under the
law-may seek patent rights for inventions stemming from such research, so long as

12 Mowery et al., supra note 5, at 104 (noting that only 264 patents were issued to universities
in 1979).
13 See IVORY TOWER INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 24 ("[T]he bulk of federal funding of
academic research was predicated on the expectation that the research would yield practical benefits
for the federal agency missions").
14Id. at 87. Beginning in the 1960s, a few governmental funding agencies (like the National
Science Foundation) began to negotiate Institutional Patent Agreements ("IPAs") with individual
institutions, allowing them to own and license patents flowing from funded research. Id. at 45.
While IPAs generally resulted in more patents for universities, not all institutions had such
agreements, and the granting of them varied depending on the funding agency. Id. at 53.

15See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1702; Michael S.
Mireles, The Intended and Unintended Consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act in 2 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 283, 287 (Peter
K. Yu ed., 2007).
16 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3.
17Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12
(2006)).
18Passage of the Act led to the growing establishment of TTOs and a decline in university
reliance on the Research Corporation for patenting and licensing activities. See IVORY TOWER
INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 81. By 1985, the Research Corporation held only 5% of the total
share of university patents. Id. at 80.
19 See IVORY TOWER INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 91-92.

20 Large business contractors now enjoy the benefits initially only extended to small businesses
and nonprofits under the Act due to amendments enacted in 1983 and 1984. See Eisenberg, supra
note 15, at 1694-95; IVORY TOWER INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 93. Some argue that their initial
exclusion was a political calculation: liberals would not have supported the Act if they saw it as
favoring big business. See WASHBURN, supra note 9, at 67; Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of
Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 96 (2004).
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they follow certain requirements. 21 The general purpose of the Act was to benefit the
American public by moving to the marketplace the results of government-funded
research that was not being used efficiently. Congress codified the specific policy
objectives of the Act as being:
[1] to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported
research or development;
[2] to encourage maximum participation of small business
federally supported research and development efforts;

firms in

[3] to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit
organizations, including universities;
[4] to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small
business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and
enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery;
[5] to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions
made in the United States by United States industry and labor;
[6] to ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in federally
supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and
[7] [to] protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions;
and
[8] to minimize the costs of administering polices in this area.22
The rise of competition from Japan and the belief that foreign companies were
benefitting from the results of federally-funded research also influenced
lawmakers. 23 Subsequent commentators have defended the Act on many grounds,
including that university engagement in technology transfer is "squarely within the
research university's core missions of discovery, learning, and the promotion of social
wellbeing." 24
In addition to retaining "a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up
license to practice" any patented invention resulting from its funding, 25 the federal
government also retains "march-in" rights under the Act whereby it can take back
ownership of patented technology developed with federal funds under certain
21 It is an open question as to whether a university patentee that fails to comply with the Act's
detailed title-taking requirements may enforce the patent. See generally Scott D. Locke, Patent
Litigation over Federally Funded Inventions and the Consequences of Failing to Comply with BayhDole, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2003).
22 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006).
23 See Mireles, supra note 15, at 285; Stevens, supra note 20, at 94; WASHBURN, supra note 9,
at 8.
24 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 2.
25 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4).
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circumstances. 26 These circumstances include when a contractor fails to undertake
reasonable commercialization efforts, when governmental action is necessary to
alleviate health or safety needs, when governmental action is necessary to meet the
requirements for public use specified by the Act, or when the patented technology has
not been manufactured or implemented primarily in the United States. 27 In
exercising its rights under this provision, the funding agency may require the
contractor to grant it a non-exclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license in any
field of use, upon reasonable terms. 28 The federal government has never exercised its
march-in rights, which some commentators call an unintended consequence of the
Act. 29 They argue that the Act was never meant to cede total control of federallyfunded research to universities and businesses.30
In contrast to march-in rights-which only may be exercised after title to an
invention has vested with a contractor-the "exceptional circumstances" provision of
the Act allows the funding agency to restrict or eliminate a contractor's right to
retain title to a federally-funded invention at the time of funding.31 The funding
agency may exercise this provision when doing so "will better promote the policy and
objectives" of the Act. 32 This provision, too, has seldom been used. The government's
diminished oversight and interpretation of the Act, as well as its limited access to
relevant information, has resulted in the march-in and exceptional circumstances
provisions having little practical importance. 33
While the Act brought significant changes to university engagement in
technology transfer, it was not the only policy change in the early 1980s potentially
responsible for the significant increase in university patenting. The Supreme Court
of the United States also influenced university engagement in patenting by changing
key substantive rules on patentability. 34 For example, the Supreme Court decided in
1980 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty35 that living organisms are patentable subject
matter, and one year later in Diamond v. Diehr36 that certain kinds of software can
be patented. In particular, the Chakrabarty case likely encouraged universities to
pursue developments of potentially high commercial value in the emerging field of
biotechnology. 37 Universities also entered into a number of widely publicized largescale agreements with corporations (including $70 million and $100 million deals
with Hoechst and Monsanto, respectively) around the time of the Supreme Court's
expansion in the scope of patentable subject matter. 38

26 See id. § 203(a)(1)-(4).
2

7Id.

28

Id.

29 See Mireles, supra note 15, at 289-93.
30

Id.

31 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a)(ii).
32

Id.

33See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 62-63.
34 See, e.g., Mowery et al., supra note 5, at 103; IVORY TOWER

INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 93
("The origins and effects of Bayh-Dole must be viewed in the context of this larger shift in U.S.
policy toward intellectual property rights.").

3447

U.S. 303 (1980).

36 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
37 IVORY TOWER INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 126-27.
38 MATKIN, supra note 4, at 42, 69, 74; Etzkowitz & Webster, supra note 3, at 30.
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Also in the early 1980s, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
198239 that established the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("CAFC"), the only federal appellate court whose docket is defined by its subject
matter (mostly patent litigation and prosecution disputes) as opposed to geography.
While some of the goals in establishing the CAFC were to eliminate forum-shopping
and facilitate uniform rulings in a highly specialized area of the law, one of the
consequences is that this court's rulings have been viewed as more supportive of
patent holders than decisions made by regional courts of appeal in the earlier judicial
system, 40 which has made "virtually all patents more valuable." 41 The CAFC
therefore provides additional incentive for universities to patent, "since infringement
suits are now more likely to be resolved in favor of the patent owner." 42
While the inventor is the original owner of patent rights under United States
patent law, employee policies at the majority of universities in the United States help
effectuate the policy purposes of the Act by dictating that "an employee is obligated to
assign these rights to her employer as long as university resources are used in the
research." 43 These provisions typically apply to both private- and government-funded
research. They also provide, as required under the Act for government-funded
research, that the university share licensing proceeds with faculty inventors. 44
Among government, industry, and university funding, government sources
account for the majority of research and development ("R&D") dollars flowing to
universities, usually comprising around 60% of university funding for research,
compared to 5-8% from industry. 45 In 2008, universities received $31.2 billion from

39Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
40 See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT

2 (2004) ("The new court of appeals has interpreted patent law to make it easier to get patents,
easier to enforce patents against others, easier to get large financial awards from such enforcement,
and harder for those accused of infringing patents to challenge the patents' validity."). Bessen and
Meurer argue that CAFC bias for patentees is overstated due to selection bias: economic models
show that only those cases where the patentee has a 65-90% chance of winning actually go to trial.
CAFC decisions accordingly may appear skewed in favor of patentees. See James Bessen & Michael

J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, in 2
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
199, 201-02 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
41 Bagley,

supra note 5, at 236.
42Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Knowledge Creation and Diffusion of Public Science
with Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND TRADE 199, 205 (Keith
E. Maskus ed., 2008).
43 Id. at 217. On those occasions when a university does not wish to pursue a patent on an
invention disclosed by a faculty member, the Act allows the faculty member to pursue a patent so
long as the funding agency decides not to do so. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2006) ("If a contractor does
not elect to retain title to a subject invention in cases subject to this section, the Federal agency may
consider after consultation with the contractor grant requests for retention of rights by the inventor
subject to the provisions of this Act and regulations promulgated hereunder.").
44 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B).
Inventor royalties typically range from 15% to 50% and often
increase inversely with the total royalties received for a patented invention. See SHEILA SLAUGHTER
& GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER
EDUCATION 86-88 (2004) [hereinafter ACADEMIC CAPITALISM II]; Milton Cerny & Kelly L. Hellmuth,
Economic Crisis? Technology Transfer to the Rescue, 21 TAXATION EXEMPTS 6, 13 (2010).
45 See Mowery et al., supra note 5, at 102.
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the federal government, as opposed to $2.8 billion from private sources. 46 Of total
university R&D that is funded by the government, the Department of Health and
Human Services and the National Science Foundation provide the most funding
(approximately 60% and 15% of the total). 47 The Department of Defense, the
Department of Energy, NASA, and the United States Drug Administration are other
governmental groups that support university research and development.

B. Criticism
The Act had detractors at the time of its passage and continues to draw critical
evaluations thirty years later. Common criticisms include that it causes taxpayers to
double pay for federally-funded research, that it favors exclusive licenses that harm
the public good, and that the university's enhanced focus on patenting and
technology transfer-spurred in large part, but not entirely, by the Act-has eroded
the sense of community in academia, created a culture of academic capitalism,
caused faculty to experience difficulties in publishing their research, and deterred
scientific progress by contributing to the creation of patent "thickets" and a
technological "anticommons." Each of these criticisms is further discussed below.

1. Double Payment
One argument raised by some legislators in the debate surrounding the passage
of the Act was that it would cause the taxpayer to double-pay for innovative
technology: once through taxes funding the research, and again in the marketplace
in the form of higher prices and limited supply conferred by the patent premium on
the transferred technology. 48 This perceived injustice still resonates with critics of
the Act today, leading some commentators to call the Act a "windfall" for universities
and private industry at the expense of the taxpaying public. 49
The federal
government potentially could alleviate this concern to some extent by invoking more
frequently the Act's exceptional circumstances provision. As mentioned previously,
however, it seldom exercises that provision.

2. Exclusive Licensure and Singular Focus on Licensing Revenues
Another leading criticism of university involvement in technology transfer is
that universities' often singular focus on generating licensing revenues leads them to
46 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, ACADEMIC R&D EXPENDITURES:

FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 8

tbl. 1 (2010), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsfl0311/pdf/nsfl0311.pdf; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 3, at 15. Government funding of university R&D has increased dramatically over time.
See IVORY TOWER INNOVATION, supra note 3, at 24 tbl.2.1 (noting increase in government funding
from $2.1 billion in 1960 to nearly $14 billion in 1995).
4'7See NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, supra note 46, at 537 tbl.68.
48 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 18; WASHBURN, supra note 9, at 61.

49 Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1386 (2007) ( "The Bayh-Dole Act has been a great windfall for universities.").
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grant exclusive as opposed to non-exclusive licenses of patented technology, which
critics argue undermines the public-serving goal of broad dissemination of academic
research. 50 Although exclusive licenses can be held by more than one entity (for
example, multiple fields of use or geographic areas can be parceled out and each
exclusively licensed), companies are willing to pay more for exclusive licenses as they
in essence pay for increased market share-"the greater the monopoly power the
licensee is granted, the more it would pay for the patent license." 51 Exclusive
licenses provide an incentive for firms to invest in costly product development while
also making it easier for universities to negotiate, as they involve fewer transaction
costs compared to a TTO's having to identify multiple licensees and separately
negotiate a non-exclusive license with each one. Private industry also is more likely
to prefer exclusive licenses, as technological and inventor support typically
accompany exclusive licenses but not non-exclusive licenses. 52
Detractors argue that exclusive licenses do not serve the public as they result in
higher prices to consumers, with exclusive licensees essentially acting as
monopolistic entities in setting prices. Research suggests that universities most
often do what for-profit firms would do, "which is to maximize revenue by using
exclusivity or not, depending on which leads to greater revenue under the specific
circumstances," 53 as "they have every incentive under the Bayh-Dole Act to try to
negotiate license terms that will give them as big a share of the profits as they can
get." 54 But a singular attention to maximizing revenue generation by licensing

50See, e.g., IVORY TOWER INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 191 (arguing that non-exclusive
licensing agreements better disseminate academic research consistent with universities' publicserving missions); Jerry Thursby, Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Objectives, Characteristicsand
Outcomes of University Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59
(2001) (finding that, in a survey of 76 TTOs at major research universities, licensing income was the
most important criterion by which TTOs measure their own success). But see Ass'n of Univ. Tech.
Managers, Statistics Access for Tech Transfer ("STATT") Licensing Survey, 2000-2009 (reporting
16,294 exclusive licenses compared to 19,394 non-exclusive
licenses), available at
http://www.autm.net/source/STATT/index.cfm?section=STATT (last visited June 9, 2011).
51 WEISBROD

ET AL., supra note 1, at 158. Dovid Kanarfogel believes that existing university

incentives that favor exclusive licensing can be rectified to align technology transfer practice more
with the university's public-serving mission by involving faculty in the licensing process. See Dovid
A. Kanarfogel, Rectifying the Missing Costs of University Patent Practices: Addressing Bayh-Dole
Criticisms Through Faculty Involvement, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 533 (2009). He argues that
increased faculty involvement would help assure "that those making decisions about what to do with
the patent rights of a given invention are aware of all positive externalities." Id. at 553. His
suggestions include creating departmental representative positions on technology transfer
management boards, requiring faculty conferences before certain key licensing decisions are made,
and including faculty on hiring committees for TTOs. Id. at 551-53. Unfortunately, his proposal
fails to address the extent to which universities currently practice his suggestions or the extent to
which those suggestions already might have proven protective of the public interest goals he favors.
52 Non-exclusive licenses are not without their own criticisms, though. Some argue that they
amount to a university-levied tax. See, e.g., WASHBURN, supra note 9, at 53-54. Also, the prospect
of commercializing certain blockbuster inventions-such as an effective drug for treating AIDSmay lead some firms to pursue commercialization without any license at all, on the belief that "their
potential profitability is sufficiently large and downstream innovations can themselves be patented."
IVORY TOWER INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 174-76.
53 WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 1, at 159.
54Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1710-11.
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patents may not be a profitable approach for many institutions.55 According to a
study of 101 universities and academic health centers from 1996 to 2005 conducted
by Professors Joshua Powers and Eric Campbell, twenty licenses per institution per
year was the optimization point for chances of net positive return on R&D
investment. 56 Institutions licensing at that level had a 50% chance of net positive
return, while net returns beyond that scale fell off considerably. 5 7 Their data also
indicate that no university exceeded a 65% chance of profitability in ten years, and
that 35% of the institutions never realized profitability over the ten-year period, no
matter how much they invested.5 8
Professors Burton Weisbrod, Jeffrey Ballou, and Evelyn Asch view university
use of exclusive licenses as representative of the struggle in higher education
between mission goods and revenue goods-that is, activities that advance an
institution's mission versus raise money that the institution can use to further its
mission. Tension arises with exclusive licenses because "[t]he direct advancement of
mission calls for maximum access to university research, not to restrictive licensing
of patents.
Generation of revenue, by contrast, calls for not giving valuable
information away but pursuing patents and then licensing their use in return for
royalties and, in the process, restricting access." 59 Weisbrod et al. argue that the
conflict between revenue and mission is likely to be resolved in favor of revenue in
most instances.
Others have suggested that patenting and exclusive licensure is not the best
approach for maximizing the social returns on federal R&D investment. 60 These
authors argue that more open channels of information dissemination, such as
publications, conferences, and consulting, may be equally if not more effective. Even
if pursuing such channels meant lowering financial returns on university-owned
patents and licenses, Professors David Mowery, Richard Nelson, Bhaven Sampat,
and Arvids Ziedonis argue that such an approach would "enhance universities'
contributions to domestic and global economic welfare." 61 Their position appears to
run counter to the intent of the Act's co-sponsor, former Senator Bayh, who in
introducing his bill to the Senate in 1978 argued that private companies could not
55

See, e.g., Michael N. Bastedo & Nathan F. Harris, The State Role in Entrepreneurshipand

Economic Development: Governance, Oversight, and Public University Start-Up Innovation, in 19
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH,
MEASURING THE SOCIAL VALUE OF INNOVATION:
A LINK IN THE UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUATION 215, 219 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2009) (noting that

"licensing has yet to yield significant financial returns for most universities").
56See Joshua B. Powers & Eric G. Campbell, University Technology Transfer in Tough
Economic Times, CHANGE, Nov./Dec. 2009, at 45-46.
57Id. at 46.
58 Id.
59 WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 1, at 153-54.
60See, e.g., Mowery et al., supra note 5, at 118 (arguing that the assumption that patents and
exclusive licensure are the best approach to maximize the social returns to the federal R&D
investments "appears to understate the effectiveness of publication and other, more open channels
for information dissemination and access in enabling society to benefit from publicly funded
academic research."); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole
Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052 (2003) ("Exclusive patent rights provide an incentive for firms to invest in
costly development, but only to the extent that patents are effective in protecting intellectual
property (IP), which varies by industry.").
61 Mowery et al., supra note 5, at 118.
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expenditures unless they were given the

3. Academic Capitalism and Entrepreneurism
Another common criticism of university involvement in technology transfer is
that it has contributed to the injection of private market values into higher
education, further eroding the sense of community in academia and injuring the
public good. Professors Sheila Slaughter, Gary Rhoades, and Larry Leslie are
leading proponents of this argument, 63 although others also have made it to varying
degrees. 64
Slaughter, Rhoades, and Leslie's signature contribution has been in positing a
theory of academic capitalism that they argue is the new regime existing in research
universities, replacing or existing alongside what they style as the traditional public
good knowledge/learning regime. Academic capitalism theory supports questioning
"the presumption that [universities engaged in technology transfer] exist for the good
of the general public and that they further the values of society." 65 The theory also
challenges the notion of universities as set apart from society, as special bastions
marked by "objectivity, impartiality, and aloofness from commercial concerns." 66
Under academic capitalism theory, universities value knowledge privatization
and profit taking in which institutions, inventor-faculty, and corporations have
claims before the public. 67 Traditional barriers between public and private sectors
are eroded under this theory, enabling not-for-profit institutions and professionals to
engage the private sector marketplace directly, most often at their own instigation,
as the "major players in and initiators of the process." 68 Subscribers to academic
capitalism view the Act as largely responsible for these consequences,6 9 which they
view negatively. 70 They also identify so-called interstitial organizations (namely,
62See Stevens, supra note 20, at 95 (quoting Senator Bayh as saying "[u]nless private industry
has the protection of some exclusive use under patent or license agreements, they cannot afford the
risk of commercialization expenditures").
63See generally ACADEMIC CAPITALISM II, supra note 44; Rhoades & Slaughter, supra note 11;
SHEILA SLAUGHTER & LARRY L. LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY (1997) [hereinafter ACADEMIC CAPITALISM I].

64See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 5, at 238-54 (identifying increased secrecy, the withholding of
data, and an erosion of the sense of community within academia as costs of universities' increased
engagement in patenting and technology transfer); DEREK C. BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE
MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 156 (2003) ("When rules are
unclear and always subject to negotiation, money will prevail over principle much of the time.
Resourceful companies will pick universities apart, finding individual faculties willing to grant them
what they want, then using these concessions to pressure other institutions with which they seek to
interact.").
65Ritchie de Larena, supra note 49, at 1412.
66 MATKIN, supra note 4, at 56.
67 See ACADEMIC CAPITALISM II, supra note 44, at 29.
68Rhoades & Slaughter, supra note 63, at 119.
69 See ACADEMIC CAPITALISM I, supra note 63, at 46 ("In a very real sense the Bayh-Dole Act
encouraged academic capitalism.").
70 In her earlier work with Larry Leslie, Professor Slaughter argued that "[1]eaders of
corporations, government, and tertiary institutions increasingly see faculty work as possible
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TTOs) and intermediating networks (such as the Association of Technology Managers
("AUTM"))-created to foster university engagement in technology transfer-as
bearing some responsibility for redefining the public sphere in higher education,
wherein for-profit behavior is increasingly accommodated and even celebrated.7 1
A related strand of criticism focuses on academic entrepreneurism, or faculty
behavior "as amphibious creatures, moving back and forth as consultants and
advisors and as founders of university spin-off firms." 72 Professors Diana Rhoten and
Walter Powell suggest that academic capitalism and entrepreneurism have changed
the historical dividing line between public versus proprietary research. 7 3 They argue
that hybridized arrangements that combine elements of both public and private
science increasingly will be the norm. 74 The characterization of science by the late
sociologist Robert Merton as a social and public enterprise guided by the ideals of
communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, originality, and skepticism seem
quaint and outmoded under this new formulation of science. 75
Positing that revenues from technology transfer often derive from research of a
type that bears little or no relation to the educational and scientific public purposes
for which the university is exempted from taxation on income, one author has argued
that licensing revenue should be subjected to the unrelated business income tax in
certain situations. 76 Under this proposal, two distinct types of patent-licensing
agreements would exist: taxable and nontaxable. 77 Taxable agreements would
consist of any agreement that calls for a delay in academic publishing, constitutes an
exclusive license, or involves a faculty conflict of interest. 78 While such agreements
have not been implemented, the proposal represents one way society could hold
universities accountable for engaging in behavior that some view as undermining
their role of furthering public as opposed to private interests.

intellectual property, more valuable in global markets as product or commodity than as
unremunerated contribution to an international community of scholars." See ACADEMIC CAPITALISM
I, supra note 63, at 39. They also alleged that faculty had become "state-subsidized entrepreneurs,"
acting "as capitalists within the public sector." Id. at 210.
71See ACADEMIC CAPITALISM II, supra note 44, at 306-07, 313-15; Gary Rhoades, Housing the

Measurement of University Innovations' Social Value: OrganizationalSite, Professional Perspective,
Institutional Outlook in 19 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH, MEASURING THE SOCIAL VALUE OF INNOVATION: A LINK IN THE UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUATION 237, 241-46, 252 (Gary D. Libecap ed.,
2009).
72Diana Rhoten & Walter W. Powell, The Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Expanded
Protection Versus New Models of Open Science, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 345, 356 (2007).
73Id. at 346.
74Id.
5 Id. at 347.

76 See Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, From "Publishor Perish" to "Profit or Perish": Revenues

from University Technology Transfer and the f 501(c) (3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 89, 14142 (1996).

77 Id. at

141.

78 Id. at 142-46.
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4. Costs to Faculty
Some view university involvement in technology transfer as placing serious
burdens on faculty. A leading concern is potential delay in the publication of
scientific research. United States patent laws require that an invention be novel in
order to be patentable. 79 To meet this requirement, the law further specifies that the
invention not be made available to the public, via publication, use, or sale, more than
one year prior to the filing of the patent application. 80 This one-year bar-which has
been called "rigid," "unforgiving," and "not conducive to academic discourse" 81-does
not exist in many foreign countries that have "first-inventor-to-file" as opposed to
"first-to-invent" patent laws, unlike the United States. 82 Accordingly, in the interest
of maintaining novelty, some faculty choose to delay publication of research results
until after at least a provisional patent application has been filed in the United
States. Such delays have led some commentators to note a rising culture of secrecy
among academic researchers. 83 Researchers' unfamiliarity with the patent system
also may cause confusion and unnecessary delays in publishing results of scientific
studies.
A related potential concern to faculty researchers is that the language of patents
and the language of science do not always overlap. 84 Legal discourse is based on a
hierarchical set of rules that often turn on argumentation and nuances of expression.
Scientific discourse, on the other hand, is built on accountability to empirical fact.
Accordingly, some faculty may be uncomfortable or even unable to appropriately
document and convey inventions within the strictures of legal discourse. 85 Such a
difficulty could be of real concern to those faculty researchers who work at a
university with a peer review system that takes into account researcher
accomplishments within the patent system, as is increasingly the norm. 86 This trend
7 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
80See id. § 102(b).
81 Bagley, supra note 5, at 220-21.
82However, the United States' standing as a first-to-invent country may not last much longer.
The America Invents Act (Patent Reform Act of 2011), which Congress may vote on as early as this
summer, would award patents to the first inventor to file.

See Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23,

112th Cong. (2011), 157 CONG. REC. S936-02 (2011).
83See Bagley, supra note 5, at 221 ("[S]ecrecy is on the rise among academic researchers"). In
light of this trend, Professor Bagley argues for amending the patent laws to create an opt-in system
that would allow academic researchers to enjoy a two-year as opposed to a one-year grace period for
purposes of meeting the novelty requirement. Id. at 254-65. She also notes that CAFC case law has
done little to dispel any felt need for secrecy. Id. at 243. For example, in In re Kopfenstein, 380 F.3d
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the court ruled that the mere presentation of study results for two and half
days at a scientific conference more than two years before filing for a patent barred issuance of a
patent on the subject invention, even though no copies of the document were distributed at the
conference.
84See Katherine T. Durack, Technology Transfer and Patents: Implications for the Production
of Scientific Knowledge, 15(3) TECHNICAL COMMC'N Q. 315, 325 (2006) (noting the "fundamental
tension between legal discourse and scientific discourse").
85 Id. at 324-26.
86See ACADEMIC CAPITALISM II, supra note 44, at 107.
The academic capitalist system is setting up an alternative system of rewards in
which discovery is valued because of its commercial properties and economic
rewards, broad scientific questions are couched so that they are relevant to
commercial possibilities (biotechnology, telecommunications, computer science),

[10:623 2011]

University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation

637

is particularly troubling to those scholars who see the traditional academic reward
system that gives primacy to peer-reviewed publications as inherently in conflict
with the new form of reward system that also takes into account contributions to
technology transfer, an activity they regard as purely "focused on revenue generation
from applied research."87

5. Patent "Thickets" and the "Tragedy of the Anticommons"
A further consequence of the Act is that universities are seeking and obtaining
patents at an increased rate each year, particularly in lucrative fields like
biotechnology. 88 This heightened activity has led one commentator to allege that the
Act allows universities to "irresponsibly over-patent" 89 and that "[i]deally,
universities should patent less and license more, since without commercial potential,
patents can only be obstructive to other researchers." 90 Regardless of whether
universities' pursuit of patents has been conducted responsibly, the heightened
activity may have resulted in the creation of patent "thickets"-i.e., patent-rich fields
of technology-and what Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg call the
"tragedy of the anticommons." 91 In contrast to the free-rider problem associated with
the late ecologist Garret Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" theory, 92 "tragedy of the
anticommons" theory holds that too many rights-holders in a particular technological
space may block all rights holders such that no one party is able to use the property
effectively. Such a phenomenon could result in an underuse of technology that
frustrates innovation.
To address these and other problems, Judge Ritchie de Larena has argued for
the creation of a unified, independent, private, national technology transfer center to
manage the disposition of intellectual property on all federally-funded inventions. 93
A percentage of royalties would go back to the funding agency, with only a nominal
amount flowing to universities. 94 Her position is that such a system would be better
equipped than "faculty-controlled institutions" to be the appropriate stewards of
America's intellectual property. 95 Other authors have argued that faculty ownership

knowledge is regarded as a commodity rather than a free good, and universities
have the organization capacity (and are permitted by law) to license, invest, and
profit from these commodities.
Id.
87 Donald S. Siegel, Mike Wright & Andy Lockett, The Rise of Entrepreneurial Activity at
Universities: Organizationaland Societal Implications, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 489, 497 (2007).
88See IVORY TOWER INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 182 (noting the increase and "the unusual
strength and economic value of patents and licenses" for inventions in the biomedical sciences).
89 Ritchie de Larena, supra note 49, at 1376.
90Id. at 1425.
91 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedial Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
92See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
93 Ritchie de Larena, supra note 49, at 1439.
94 Id. at 1440-41.
95 Id. at 1444.
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of inventions would be a better model. 96 However, a recent study by the National
Academy of Sciences concluded that neither faculty ownership of inventions nor a
national technology transfer licensing center would present distinct advantages over
the current system.97

III. UNIVERSITY INVOLVEMENT IN PATENT-RELATED LITIGATION

One largely overlooked cost of university involvement in technology transfer is
university involvement in patent-related litigation. As patent holders and employers
of researchers actively engaged in cutting-edge research, universities both can sue
and be sued for patent infringement. At first glance, universities' affirmative
involvement as plaintiffs in patent-related litigation would seem to pose particular
concerns for their role and image as serving the public good. Unlike large for-profit
enterprises that view intellectual property litigation as a cost of doing business,
universities generally are not in the business of manufacturing products or using
processes covered by patents. Accordingly-and consistent with the view that the
university exists to serve the public good-one may naively assume that universities
seldom engage in patent-related litigation, or at least seldom initiate such litigation.
Litigation, after all, is costly and taxing. It lifts disputes out of the realm of the
private and personal, politicizes them, and allows groups and individuals to "play out
their problems as conflicts between good guys and bad guys." 98 Intellectual property
litigation in particular "reflects competition and conflict." 99 Why would a university
choose to engage in such a practice? Some may view universities as having loftier
endeavors to be concerned with than engaging in a contentious, public, and drawnout process through which they seek vindication of business interests.
In reality, universities engage in various types of patent-related litigation, in
both defensive and offensive postures. These involvements may seem contrary to the
idealized image of the university being removed from the rough-and-tumble field of
litigation, yet are fully consistent with the role of universities as intellectual property
owners in a knowledge-based economy.
Patenting effectively creates limited
monopolies for sale. 100 It is by definition an expensive commercial activity. When
universities engage in it they open the door to patent-related litigation of all stripes,
as further discussed below.

96See, e.g., James D. Clements, Improving Bayh-Dole: A Case for Inventor Ownership of
Federally Sponsored Research Patents, 49 IDEA 469, 496-500 (2009) (arguing that inventor
ownership would lead to a higher probability of inventions being successfully brought to market).
97 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 63-64.
98 DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 129 (2002).
9 Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on
Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 129 (2001).
100 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 40, at 7, 51 (observing that a patent "creates a kind of
monopoly for its owner" and that "patents are blunt instruments. Because of the complexity of the
evolution of technology, the monopoly that they create will sometimes retard rather than encourage
competition").
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A. Varieties of "PatentLitigation"
Commentators and practitioners alike often speak of "patent litigation" as if the
term had a precise and readily agreed upon meaning. But what are we really talking
about when we talk about university involvement in patent litigation? The Patent
Act1 0 1 provides for various causes of action, including actions to overturn a decision
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") to deny a patent
application, dispute the inventorship of a patent, contest the length of a patent's term
or its issuance, and obtain relief for infringement of a patent. Other actions not
contemplated by the Patent Act, but rather rooted in common law, may be closely
tied to the university's involvement in patenting and technology transfer, leading
some to loosely call these actions patent litigation as well. This subsection provides a
brief description of the types of patent litigation that are not the focus of this
article. 102

1. Prosecution-RelatedLitigation
Universities aggrieved during the patent prosecution process can initiate
litigation against the USPTO in response to a final office action by a patent
examiner. These cases are first heard before the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences. 103 Its decisions are appealable to the United States District Court of
the District of Columbia or to the CAFC. 1 04 If a university cares to dispute the
duration of a patent that has issued to it, it may initiate such litigation against the
USPTO in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia. 105

2. Inventorship Litigation
Universities that believe one or more of their faculty or researchers through
error are not named on a patent may bring an action in a federal district court,
seeking an order that the USPTO be made to amend the listed inventors of the
patent. 106 Actions of this sort typically arise out of faculty engagement in research

101See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).

102Subsequent research should explore the nature and extent of university involvement in
these activities. This article does not attempt to do so in anything other than topical fashion.
103 See 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) ("An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice
rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, having once paid the fee for such appeal.").
104 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145.
105 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Univ. of Mass. v. Kappos, No. 10-0894 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2010)
(seeking that the patent term adjustment for the patent in suit be changed from 623 days to 1,276
days). 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A) is the statute that provides for the appeal of a patent term
adjustment determination. The same statute guarantees no more than a three-year application
pendency. See id. §154(b)(1)(B). The director of the USPTO must grant a patent term adjustment if
delays occur outside the applicant's control. See id.
106See 35 U.S.C. § 256. Universities also may be named defendants in such actions. See, e.g.,
Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y., 434 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (upholding grant
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funded by private industry. The agreements governing such research often vest
ownership of resultant intellectual property with the university, but private industry
partners may decide to seek patents in their own name anyway, perhaps believing
that the patent covers technology not discovered by the faculty researcher or not
discovered pursuant to a research agreement with the university.
The CAFC
recently ruled against a university in its attempt to obtain joint ownership of a
patent in precisely such a situation.o107

3. False Marking Actions
Section 292 of the Patent Act establishes causes of action for false marking,
which can include falsely marking that an unpatented article is patented, that a
patent application has been filed for an article over which an application has not
been filed, or for marking, affixing, or advertising "the name or any imitation of the
name of a patentee, the patent number, or the words 'patent,' 'patentee,' or the like,
with the intent of counterfeiting or imitating the mark of the patentee, or of
deceiving the public and inducing them to believe that the thing was made, offered
for sale, sold, or imported into the United States by or with the consent of the
1 08
patentee."o
The fine for false marking is $500 for every offense, 109 and "any person
may sue for the penalty," provided one-half of any damages awarded goes to the
government. 110
Universities are unlikely parties to bring false marking suits unless they have
other patent-related causes of action against the same defendant.111

4. Interferences
Occasionally the USPTO may issue a patent covering an invention for which a
university has a pending application, and for which it believes it is the first inventor.
In such event the university can request that the USPTO conduct an interference
proceeding between the pending application and the issued patent, in order to

of summary judgment to the university in a lawsuit brought by a former medical student seeking to
be added as a co-inventor to a university-owned patent).
107See Vanderbilt Univ. v. ICOS Corp., 601 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding district court
finding that university is not joint owner of patents covering erectile dysfunction drug, despite prior
research agreement between university faculty and company that assigned patents to defendant).
Other cases of this sort include University of Delaware v. Global Solar Energy, Inc., No. 09-0036 (D.
Del. filed Jan. 15, 2009) (alleging that the inventorship question posed by the lawsuit arises out of
work conducted by the university, through its faculty, in collaboration with the defendant), and
Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund v. Ipsen Pharma, S.A.S., No. 09-2428 (D.D.C. filed
Dec. 28, 2009) (alleging that university's faculty member partnered on research efforts with
defendant's subsidiary for over twenty years).
108 35 U.S.C. § 292(a).
109 Id
110 See id. §292(b).
111See, e.g., Complaint, STC.UNM v. Envtl. Robots, Inc., No. 10-0094, (D.N.M. Feb. 4, 2010)
(alleging patent infringement, breach of contract, and false marking against the same defendant).
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determine priority of invention. 11 2 The CAFC deems such proceedings "litigationtype activity,"113 the outcome of which is appealable either to the CAFC or to a
federal district court. 114

5. DeclaratoryJudgment and Defense of Patent Infringement Actions
Universities also may participate in declaratory judgment actions. A claimant
in such actions seeks a federal court's declaration that its planned or actual business
activity does not infringe another's patent. 115 Claimants usually seek, as part of the
same litigation, the court's declaration that the patent held by the university is
invalid and therefore unenforceable. The finder of fact in such litigation can conclude
that the patent is invalid and not infringed, that the patent is not invalid and is
infringed, or that the patent is not invalid and not infringed. Universities are more
likely to defend than initiate these actions, 1 1 6 given that they do not typically
commercialize in their own name products or processes covered by their patents.
Universities may bring such a claim, however, as a defensive measure when
industry patent holders sue universities and faculty researchers, alleging that work
conducted by faculty researchers infringes industry-held patents and that
universities-as employers of faculty-as well as individual faculty members
themselves are ultimately liable for any such infringements. Until 2002, earlier case
law and opinions from industry commentators led universities to believe that the
"experimental use" exception to patent infringement excused them from any
potential infringement liability. 117 That common law exception excuses defendants
from infringement liability if the infringing act is undertaken solely for amusement,
to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry. 118 The CAFC limited its
application, however, in a 2002 case, Madey v. Duke University.119 While the initial
112See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a); 37 C.F.R. § 41.202(a),(b) (2010).
113 See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
114 See Wu v. Wang, 129 F.3d 1237, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (judicial appeals under § 141 and

§ 146

are alternative routes to challenge the final judgment of the Board of Patent Appeals and

Interferences in an interference proceeding). For example, in Vas-Cath, the University of Missouri
initiated and won an interference proceeding, resulting in the award of a patent to the university
and the stripping of a patent from Vas-Cath. Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1379. Vas-Cath appealed the
ruling to a federal district court, which granted the university's motion to dismiss based on its
assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Id. at 1379-80. On further
appeal, the CAFC held that the university's initiation of an interference proceeding barred its
assertion of immunity in any appeal of the adjudication. Id. at 1383-84.
115 See, e.g., Complaint 33, Life Techs. Corp. v. Oxford Biomed. Research, Inc., No. 09-0029,
(M.D. Tenn. Jan. 9, 2009) (seeking declaration that a patent owned by Vanderbilt University was
invalid and not infringed).
116 See, e.g., Complaint
12-19, Genentech, Inc. v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., No. 10-2037 (N.D.
Cal. May 11, 2010) (seeking declaratory judgment alleging that the university notified plaintiff "on
multiple occasions that it needs to take a license" to the patent in suit to avoid infringement).
117 See IVORY TOWER INNOVATION, supra note 10, at 187-88.
118 See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the
CAFC has construed the experimental use exception "very narrowly").
119 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The case involved a former Duke scientist who alleged that
Duke was infringing his patent for laser technology when Duke used a laser embodying the
technology in one of its laboratories. Id. at 1352-53. The CAFC ruled against Duke, holding that
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reaction was to view Madey as inhibiting faculty research, some have argued that its
practical effect is more nuanced. 1 20 Regardless of the application vel non of the
experimental use exception, universities may seek a court's declaration that a
plaintiffs patent is invalid and not infringed in response to a plaintiffs infringement
allegation. Universities also can seek such rulings affirmatively in response to a
reasonable threat of litigation by a patent holder.

6. Common Law Disputes Involving Patents
Some cases involving universities and technology transfer may not arise under
the Patent Act yet nevertheless may be tied intimately to the university's
involvement in patenting and technology transfer. These lawsuits often stem from
the unique contractual relationship between faculty and universities. As a condition
of their employment as employees of the university, faculty and researchers typically
are required to sign or accept (via assent to policies in a faculty handbook) the
intellectual property policy maintained by the university. These policies usually
require faculty and researchers to transfer ownership of any patentable discovery
made by them during the course of their employment with the university to the
university or its designee. They also typically set forth the structure for receipt of
royalties for any revenues generated by university licensure of the inventor's patents.
Litigation can arise when faculty or universities fail to uphold the terms of these
agreements. 121
Issues are further complicated when for-profit companies are
universities are not automatically exempt from patent infringement liability if the alleged
infringement is in furtherance of the university's legitimate business. Id. at 1362. The court stated:
In short, regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged
infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very
narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense. Moreover, the profit or
non-profit status of the user is not determinative.
Id.
120See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 939 (2006) (arguing that a narrow
experimental use exception benefits major patent-holders like universities, as "[m]illions of dollars
in licensing revenues and royalties would be lost, for instance, if all research were exempted from
infringement until commercialized").
Rowe further suggests that universities enjoy de facto
immunity for purely research-related infringement activities that do not generate revenues, as
patentees are deterred by the high cost of patent infringement litigation from filing suit to stop the
infringement. Id. at 943.
121See, e.g., Complaint, The Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Suppes, No. 09-4012 (W.D. Mo.
Jan. 26, 2009) (outlining the university's allegation that a faculty researcher submitted altered
invention disclosure forms to the university). The complaint states:
But rather than disclose and assign those inventions as required, Suppes has on
approximately 31 occasions submitted invention disclosure forms that were
altered, usually by deleting or substantially modifying the specific assignment
language contained in the forms such that Suppes did not in fact assign any
meaningful rights to the University. On these occasions Suppes submitted the
forms without bringing his alterations to anyone's attention.
Id. 15. These forms allegedly looked like the invention disclosure forms that faculty are required
to submit under their employment agreements with the university, although they purportedly had
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involved. 122 The Supreme Court recently decided a case involving competing claims
to patent ownership by a university and a for-profit company. 123
Disagreements also may arise between universities and their licensees over
licensing issues. For example, a licensee may allege that the university has breached

been altered to allow the faculty member to retain ownership of the inventions. Id. The faculty
member and a post-doctoral fellow allegedly subsequently filed several patent applications without
the university's knowledge or involvement. Id. 17. They then allegedly abandoned a few of these
applications without telling the university, and refused to transfer handling and ownership of the
others to the university upon its demand. Id. The university brought a multi-count complaint
against both the faculty member and the post-doctoral fellow (who had left the university, allegedly
to run a company involving technology covered by the disputed patent applications), seeking the
court's determination of ownership and dates of conception and reduction to practice of the
inventions created by the faculty defendants. Id.
33-41. The university also alleged breach of
contract, tortuous interference with business relationships, and breach of duty of loyalty, and sought
immediate assignment of all inventions created by the defendants, specific performance, and an
accounting of lost profits. Id.
42-84. See also Univ. of W. Va., Bd. of Trs. v. VanVoorhies, 278
F.3d 1288, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming district court finding that former graduate student
breached his contractual duty to assign patent applications to university); Regents of the Univ. of
N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming district court finding that faculty
researchers breached their contractual duty to assign their patents and applications to university).
122See, e.g., Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1310 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (finding in favor of university and its faculty inventors in protracted unjust enrichment
lawsuit they brought against for-profit company that filed for patent protection of professors'
invention in 1981).
123See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir.
2009), aff'd, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1761 (2011). At issue was an assignment between a Stanford
faculty researcher and a predecessor company to Roche. See id. at 837. The faculty member signed
an intellectual property agreement with Stanford when he began work there in 1988. Id. In it he
promised to assign to Stanford any inventions he made during his employment. Id. A year later, he
signed a confidentiality agreement with Roche's predecessor in interest. Id. The agreement
contained language stating that the faculty member assigned to the predecessor company all rights
to any inventions stemming from his work with that company. Id. The key difference in the two
agreements is that the one with Stanford involved a promise to assign any future inventions
whereas the one with Roche's predecessor was a present-tense assignment of any future inventions.
Stanford obtained patents for the faculty member's inventions (which had been funded by

federal research grants, not by Roche's predecessor) in 1999 and 2003. Id. at 838. Stanford initiated
an infringement action against Roche in 2005 when it refused to pay a royalty for its alleged use of
the patented technology in certain products. Id. Two Stanford faculty inventors of the patents in
suit, including the one who had signed the agreement with Roche's predecessor, were co-plaintiffs in
the lawsuit. The district court found that Roche had no ownership rights in the patents, which it
found invalid for obviousness. Id. at 838-39. Both parties appealed. The CAFC held that Roche
could not be liable for infringement of the patents because it held ownership rights in them based on
the faculty member's assignment, given that "Stanford identifie [d] no authorities or reasons why its
election of title under Bayh-Dole had the power to void any prior, otherwise valid assignments of
patent rights." Id. at 844. In seeking a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, Stanford argued
that the CAFC's decision conflicted with the purpose of the Act. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
20, Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., No. 09-1159, 2010 WL 1138571,
at *20 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2010) (arguing that "permitting unilateral assignment by an individual
inventor to circumvent the statutory scheme deprives the government and the public of the benefits
intended under the Act"). However, in a 7-2 decision, the Court sided with Roche, holding that the
Act does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors, and
therefore cannot be read to frustrate the Stanford faculty researcher's assignment of his invention to
Roche's predecessor. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., 98
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1761 (2011).
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a contractual obligation by granting additional licenses, failing to disclose previous
licenses, or failing to provide support as specified under a license. 124

B. University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation

Universities also may engage in patent-related litigation by initiating patent
infringement lawsuits. While patents grant their holders a limited right (of twenty
years from the date of filing a non-provisional patent application) to exclude others in
the United States from making, using, selling, or offering for sale any product or
process that is covered by one or more claims of a valid patent, 125 they are not selfenforcing. To enforce a patent requires the patent holder to police the marketplace
for potentially infringing activities. Policing typically leads to one of two outcomes: a
confrontation with the alleged infringer that results in an out-of-court settlement
between the parties, or a confrontation with the alleged infringer that results in a
patent infringement action being filed in court. 126
Patent infringement litigation has been called the "sport of kings" as it is
complex, uncertain, and expensive. 127 It is also rare, as only 1% of subsisting patents
ever will be litigated. 128 The expense of patent infringement litigation is enough to
deter all but the most wealthy and committed of litigants. The expense also is
enough to mean that fewer than 5 % of all patent infringement cases actually go to
trial, with the majority settling during discovery. 1 29 With respect to actual dollar
values, survey data collected in 2008 by the American Intellectual Property Law
Association from law firms specializing in intellectual property law revealed that for
patent infringement lawsuits with less than $1 million at risk, the median cost for
one party to take a case through the end of discovery was $350,000, with the mean
cost being $498,000. 130 The total median cost for a party to take a case with less than
$1 million at risk through trial and any appeal was $650,000, and the mean cost was
$967,000. 131 The median figures for taking a case through discovery and through
trial were $1.5 million and $2.5 million, respectively, for suits with $1-$25 million at
risk, and $3 million and $5.5 million for suits with more than $25 million at risk. 132
124See, e.g., Complaint

25-27, Functional Genetics, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford

Jr. Univ., No. 09-4703 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2009) (alleging failure to disclose previously issued license,
allegedly rendering plaintiffs license non-exclusive).
125 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (2006). Interestingly, two-thirds of issued patents never last the full
term permitted by statute, as their patentees fail to pay the modest maintenance fees due to the
USPTO at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years after issuance. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A.

Moore, & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 440-41 (2004).
126Technically, a claim for patent infringement can be brought either in a complaint (by a
plaintiff) or in a counterclaim (by a defendant), in response to an allegation that the patent in suit is
invalid and not infringed.
127Douglas J. Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, TECH. REV. (Apr. 28, 2004),

http://www.technologyreview.com/read-article.aspx?id=13562.
128Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 99, at 131.
129See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 40, at 200.
130AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY

29, I-128 (2009).
131 Id
132 Id
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The mean costs for these high-risk cases were significantly higher than the median
costs.
These figures reflect only the monetary costs of patent infringement litigation.
Non-monetary costs include the disruption to inventors and other professionals in
strategizing with attorneys, collecting and producing documents, testifying in
depositions, and preparing for court appearances, among other time-consuming
activities. 133 Perhaps in part because of the significant monetary and non-monetary
costs, 9 9 % of patent owners never file suit to enforce their rights, leading
commentators to conclude that litigated patents are valuable patents, as "[a] rational
patent owner will not file suit unless his expected return is at least a few million
dollars." 134
Professors Scott Shane and Deepak Somaya provide insight into the nonmonetary costs on TTOs at universities that initiate patent infringement
litigation. 1 35 They conducted a mixed methods study examining the impact of
university-led patent infringement litigation at 116 U.S. research institutions from
1987 to 2000.136 From 203 identified lawsuits in the relevant time period, the
authors calculated the number of "litigation days" that universities were involved in
the lawsuits. 137 Using data collected by AUTM from institutions with a TTO, they
then compared litigation days to the number of new patent licenses, the number of
new exclusive licenses, the number of new patent applications filed, and the number
of new invention disclosures filed in the subsequent year. 1 38 The results showed that
university involvement in patent infringement litigation correlated with decreased
numbers of new patent licenses and new exclusive licenses in subsequent years;
there was no significant relationship between litigation involvement and new patent
filings and invention disclosures. 139
Qualitative data also supported these
findings. 140
The authors concluded that university involvement in patent
infringement litigation reduces the amount of technology licensed by universities to
the private sector, which they suggest is perhaps an unintended consequence of the
Act. 1 41 Their study does not provide specific information on the lawsuits identified-

133See Deepak Somaya, Strategic Determinants of Decisions Not to Settle Patent Litigation, 24
STRAT. MGMT. J. 17, 17 (2003) (noting that "patent litigation also involves considerable

organizational dislocation, absorbing the time and energy of key managers, lawyers, engineers, and
scientists in the company").
134Allison, Lemley, Moore & Trunkey, supra note 125, at 441. This appears to have been the
rationale of the University of Rochester, which in 2002 established an eight-figure legal fund to go
after billions of dollars in back royalties that it contended it was owed by companies that
manufacture and market Celebrex, the blockbuster arthritis drug. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Taking
on Goliath: U. of Rochester Risks Millions in Patent Fight with Pharmaceutical Giants, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 20, 2002, at A27. The CAFC thwarted the university's effort, however, by
upholding a district court decision invalidating the university's patent. See Univ. of Rochester v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
135See Scott Shane & Deepak Somaya, The Effects of Patent Litigation on University Licensing
Efforts, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 739 (2007).
136 Id. at 743-44.
137 Id
138 Id. at 745.
139 Id. at 749-52.
140 Id. at 745-49.
141 Id. at 753-54.
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for example, descriptions of the institutions and technology involved, and the extent
to which universities sued in conjunction with others, are not included.
Despite the costs and uncertainty associated with patent infringement litigation,
commentators note that "universities have aggressively enforced their patents in
court" 1 42 and "have shown no hesitancy to enforce their patents in court against
commercial infringers." 1 43 Little actually is known, however, about the extent and
circumstances of university initiation of patent infringement litigation. 144 What little
empirical data that exist suggest that nonprofits (which include more than just
universities) are "not significantly more or less likely to litigate than other types of
entities." 1 45 One explanation for the dearth of literature could be that universities
are not likely to view initiation of patent infringement litigation as central to their
mission, and thus are reluctant to draw attention to it or provide information about
it. 146 Indeed, given the costs involved and the attenuated tie to mission, one could
posit that university initiation of patent infringement litigation is a poor use of

university resources-in short, an activity that universities should avoid if they wish
not to invite scrutiny into the age-old conception of higher education as furthering
the public good.
The reality, however, is that universities may have to initiate patent
infringement litigation in order to capture the premium conferred by patents and
recoup investments in research and patenting. The patent premium is not influenced
by the for-profit or non-profit nature of a patent's holder. That is to say, the market
demand for the right to exclude others from manufacturing, for example, a cure to
cancer likely would not be diminished if the holder of the patent embodying that
technology were a university as opposed to a for-profit pharmaceutical company.
Companies clamor for exclusive rights to valuable technology and typically will pay a
premium for such rights, no matter the identity of the rights holder. But because
patents are not self-enforcing, the right to exclude depends on the ability to
effectively enforce. This means "the patent premium flows from patent litigation or,
more typically, the threat of litigation." 1 47 Failure to enforce could mean the loss of
the patent premium for a university. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that
universities must enforce their patent rights if they want to generate more net

142Rowe, supra note 120, at 936.

143Christopher M. Holman, Learning from Litigation: What Can Lawsuits Teach Us About the
Role of Human Gene Patents in Research and Innovation?, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 215, 260
(2009). See also Bagley, supra note 5, at 218-19, 222 (noting "the growth in patent-related litigation
involving universities" and "the over-zealous ... litigation ... of some university TTOs").
144Anecdotes abound, however. For example, Washburn states that "[m]any schools have
succeeded in generating impressive windfalls from their patent-infringement suits-the University
of California won a $200-million settlement from Genentech; the University of Minnesota settled a
suit against Glaxo-Wellcome for $300 million-emboldening numerous other schools to try and do
the same." WASHBURN, supra note 9, at 161.
145Allison, Lemley, Moore & Trunkey, supra note 125, at 466 n.134.
146Judge Ritchie de Larena argues, for example, that "universities prefer not to be judged at
all" when it comes to the practices of their TTOs. See Ritchie de Larena, supra note 49, at 1417.
147Bessen & Meurer, supra note 40, at 205.
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revenue from research. 1 48 Patent litigation is a costly gamble, but it is a potentially
unavoidable activity for universities that seek revenues from patenting. 149
Professor Christopher Holman's work provides additional insight into this
phenomenon, although to date his work primarily has been focused on university
involvement in litigation over the specific field of human gene patents.15 0 In an
unpublished slide presentation, however, Holman reported results from a search of
patent infringement cases filed between January 1, 2000 and January 24, 2009.151
Holman located 139 lawsuits during that time period where a university joined with
an exclusive licensee in bringing suit, and another 51 cases where a university
brought a patent infringement case by itself. 1 52 He indicates that "[s]ome lawsuits
seem inconsistent with original justification for Bayh-Dole" and that "[s]ome lawsuits
appear 'troll-like,"' 153 but the slides do not offer further insight into these conclusions,
and his research on this topic has not appeared to date in any journal.
While university patenting has increased remarkably since the passage of the
Act, so, too, has speculative patent infringement litigation (or "patent trolling") by
non-manufacturing entities (or "patent aggregators," often pejoratively called "patent
trolls"). Professor Mark Lemley explored the suggestion made by some private
industry companies that universities that initiate patent infringement litigation may
have traits in common with patent trolls. 1 54 Lemley ultimately-and appropriately
concluded that universities are not patent trolls because they support university
inventors and engage in socially beneficial technology transfer, unlike trolls who seek
only money in exchange for forbearance from litigation. 155 His article squarely raises
the concern, however, that whether universities are viewed as being more interested
in money than innovation may depend on how they engage in technology transfer.
Universities that are quick to initiate patent infringement lawsuits may find
that such efforts undercut-in the court of public opinion, anyway-their defense to
separate infringement lawsuits waged against their own researchers. 1 56 Also, forprofit companies that otherwise would be hesitant to bring an infringement lawsuit
against a university no longer may be deterred if they view the university in question
148 WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 1, at 285.
149 Cf. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 40, at 76 ("Patent litigation is expensive and risky.

Even

the threat of being forced to defend against patent infringement will, in many cases, compel
companies to pay royalties or abandon particular products.").
150 See generally Holman, supra note 143; Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene
Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV.
295 (2007).
151 Christopher M. Holman, University Patent Litigation, Presentation at Santa Clara
University School of Law Symposium (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.chtlj.org/sites/default/files/media/

symposiums/v025/slides/holman.ppt.
152 Id. at 12.
153 Id.
154 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 611, 615-19 (2008). Many view non-manufacturing entities unfavorably as they can delay
the fruits of innovation from benefitting the public. Even though they do not sell anything, nonmanufacturing entities can derail product launches until market entrants pay them off or prevail in
defending the infringement actions they often initiate.
155 Id. at 630.
156 See e.g., WASHBURN, supra note 9, at 161 (noting that a university's aggressive patent
enforcement may compromise "the university's legitimacy when one of its own academic
investigators needs access to a particular patented technology").
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as a frequent instigator of infringement litigation. Echoing the academic capitalism
argument, one commentator alleges that "money has blinded most universities to this
rather obvious inconsistency in commercial versus academic aims."157
Further to this commercial actor concern, Lemley notes that because the
university is a non-manufacturing entity, its "incentives in dealing with the patent
system align in many ways with those of private-sector patent licensing shops."158 In
patent-intensive industries, a symmetry of position exists that deters much litigation:
if a competitor sues for infringement, the competitor can countersue for infringement.
Such symmetry does not exist for patent-holding universities, and that reality may
lessen market disincentives for universities to litigate. 1 59 Because universities do not
manufacture any product, "[u]niversities aren't going to trade their patents away in
exchange for a cross-license, because they don't need a license to other people's
patent rights. Instead, they want money." 160
But industry leaders have cautioned against university initiation of patent
infringement litigation for the purpose of extracting licensing revenues. In a white
paper released by Stanford University and eleven other research institutions in the
summer of 2006 (and subsequently endorsed by AUTM), industry leaders urged that
"enforcement action"-a euphemism for patent infringement litigation-"should be
carefully considered." 161 The authors stressed that universities should be mindful of
their primary mission to use patents to promote technology development for the
benefit of society. 162 To that end, the authors argued that litigation is "seldom the
preferred option for resolving disputes" and should be initiated by the university only
if there is a "mission-oriented rationale for doing so" that can be clearly articulated to
the university and the public. 163 The authors maintained that "nuisance litigation"
should be avoided in all circumstances. 164 In a separate point, they discouraged
university involvement with patent aggregators, stating that licensing patents to
companies that "rely primarily on threats of infringement litigation to generate
revenue" does not serve the public interest. 165
The Committee on Management of University Intellectual Property of the
National Academy of Sciences endorsed the Stanford white paper in a report it
released in late 2010.166 The committee further added that "[e]nforcement of IP
rights against suspected infringers should be approached carefully to protect the
institution's resources and reputation." 167 In furtherance of this suggestion, the
committee made the following recommendation:

157

Id.

158Lemley, supra note 154, at 615.

159See Allison, Lemley, Moore & Trunkey, supra note 125, at 468.
160 Lemley, supra note 154, at 616.
161Press Release, Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in
Licensing University Technology (Mar. 6, 2007), at 6, http://www-leland.stanford.edu/group/OTL/
documents/whitepaper- 10.pdf.
162 Id
163 Id.
164 Id
165
Id. at 8. AUTM maintains a list of institutions that have endorsed this white paper at
http://www.autm.net/source/NinePoints/ninepoints endorsement.cfm (last visited June 9, 2011).
166See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 82.
167Id. at 8.
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Recommendation 7:
A university's decision to initiate legal action
against an infringer should reflect its reasons for obtaining and licensing
patents in the first instance. Examples include
*

contractual or ethical obligations to protect the rights of existing
licensees to enjoy the benefits conferred by the licensees;

*

disregard by infringer of scientific or professional norms and standards,
such as use of medical technologies outside standards of care or
professional guidelines;

*

disregard by an infringer of the institution's legitimate rights, for
example, as evidenced by a refusal to negotiate a license on reasonable
terms. 168

The committee concluded that while university initiation of patent infringement
litigation is rarely the preferred method for resolving a dispute, "it is an option
important for universities to retain." 1 69
Despite this recent attention from the National Academy of Sciences,
surprisingly little empirical information concerning the nature and extent of
university initiation of patent infringement litigation is available. Accordingly, this
article's central goal is to provide insight into the phenomenon by answering the
following research questions:
*

How many and what kinds of patents were asserted by universities, and
in how many actions, in patent infringement lawsuits filed in the twoyear period between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010 (was the
technology involved electrical/computer; drugs & medical; chemical;
mechanical; other?)?

*

Where were these lawsuits filed, and are there significant correlations
between the number of patents, plaintiffs, and defendants involved?

*

In how many of the located lawsuits were universities the sole plaintiff?

*

In how many of the located lawsuits were universities actively
practicing the patents in suit (according to their own allegations)?

*

Were university affiliated research or patent entities ever the actual
entities that filed suit instead of universities?

*

How many times did universities jointly file suit with these entities?

168 Id.

169Id. at 84. Indeed, more than just retaining the right, universities sometimes may have a
contractual obligation to one or more licensees to enforce university-owned patents, although the
contract may allow for the university to "pass the costs of such protection on to the licensees."
MATKIN, supra note 4, at 112.
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*

For universities that jointly sued with a licensee co-plaintiff, was the
licensee an exclusive licensee?

*

Did universities typically use in-house or outside counsel to litigate
infringement actions?

*

Did universities request that a judge or jury hear their claims?

*

What does a textual reading of the complaints reveal about the
litigation behaviors exhibited and the issues faced by universities that
brought patent infringement actions?

650

IV. METHODOLOGY

Data for this article were compiled in January 2011 through searches conducted
in the Derwent LitAlert database (LITALERT) within Westlaw 170 and the
LexMachina database maintained by the Intellectual Property Litigation
Clearinghouse. 171 An initial search was conducted in the Derwent LitAlert database.
In an effort to use search language that was focused yet comprehensive, the database
search targeted universities as plaintiffs, patent owners, or patent assignees. 1 72
Recognizing that many universities own, license, and litigate patents through
affiliated research entities, 1 73 the search terms were intentionally broad in an effort
170 Derwent LitAlert contains records for patent and trademark litigation lawsuits filed in the
ninety-four United States Federal District Courts that have been reported to the Commissioner of
the USPTO. The database is updated weekly, and coverage goes back to 1973. Each record may
contain several elements of identification, including the trademark registration number or patent
number and date of issuance or registration, title, inventor, owner, assignee, class number and
description, court, docket number, plaintiff, defendant, filing date, and judgment date, if applicable.
Not included in the database are copies or links to actual court filings, which were subsequently
obtained via LexMachina or the Public Access to Court Electronic Records ("PACER") database.
171 LexMachina is an intellectual property litigation database maintained at
https://lexmachina.com by the Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse ("IPLC"), originally
created at Stanford University. The database contains IP case history and docket information, links
to complaints and other court filings, and more. "The IPLC has been designed to make IP litigation
more transparent, covering all (1) patent infringement, (2) manifest copyright, (3) manifest
trademark, (4) manifest antitrust, and (5) certain trade secret lawsuits filed in the U.S. District
Court from January 1, 2000 to the present." See LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/about/
genesis (last visited June 9, 2011).
172The exact search language used in the database was as follows: plf(universit! college*
institute* board* regent* research technolog! educat!) ow(universit! college* institute* board*
regent* research technolog! educat!) pas(universit! college* institute* board* regent* research
technolog! educat!) & da(aft 12/31/2008 & bef 01/01/2011). The search yielded 1,041 results.
173Names of such known entities, that do not contain the words university or college, include
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (whose mission is to "promote, encourage and aid scientific
investigation and research at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the Morgridge Institute for
Research") and Arizona Technology Enterprises (the "exclusive intellectual property management
and technology transfer organization for ASU [Arizona State University]"). See Our Vision and
Mission, WIS. ALUMNI RES. FOUND., http://www.warf.org/about/index.jsp?cid=6 (last visited June 9,
2011); About Us, ARIZ. TECH. ENTERS., http://www.azte.com/page/about us (last visited June 9,
2011). This article uses "university affiliated research entity" or "research entity" to denote any
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to capture the name of any entity controlled by or closely affiliated with a university
that owns patents on inventions discovered by that university's faculty and
researchers.
It is important to recognize limitations to the search strategy that could have
resulted in the underreporting of university initiated patent infringement cases.
First, the Derwent LitAlert database only contains lawsuits that were reported by
federal district court clerks to the USPTO.
For various reasons, some patent
infringement lawsuits have gone unreported, particularly in early years. However,
other studies of patent infringement litigation have relied on results located in the
Derwent LitAlert database, despite this known limitation and the related risk that
not every patent infringement lawsuit reported to the USPTO by a federal court clerk
makes it into the Derwent LitAlert database.1 7 4 Therefore, it was reasonable to use
the Derwent LitAlert database for this study, recognizing that results may be underinclusive.
Another limitation-and one more within my control-is that the proposed
search terms may have failed to capture accurately the full universe of patent
infringement lawsuits brought by universities or their affiliated research entities,
even assuming all such cases are in the Derwent LitAlert database. For example,
some patent-owning entities that are in fact controlled by or affiliated with
universities may have escaped detection based on the search language I used.175
Accordingly, I inspected the complaint from each case that listed a university as the
patent assignee, but not as a plaintiff, in an attempt to avoid any such
underreporting. 1 76

organization whose primary mission is to commercialize patents owned by it or a university,
regardless of its precise corporate organization or oversight structure.
174 See, e.g., Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Strategic
Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation 18 (Ill. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Paper Series Res. Papers Series No. 08-21, Feb. 1, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1337166; Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note
99, at 133; Shane & Somaya, supra note 135, at 742-43; Somaya, supra note 133, at 21-23.
175 After conducting the search in January of 2011, 1 subsequently discovered that the affiliated
research entity for the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University is called Virginia Tech
Intellectual Properties, Inc., a name that my search terms would not have picked up. A knockout
search confirmed that Virginia Tech Intellectual Properties, Inc. did not initiate any patent
infringement litigation during the studied time period, so the results were not affected. While no
additional exception to the search terms was known at the time of this article's publication, others
might exist that potentially could render this article's findings under-inclusive.
176For example, one located case in the Derwent LitAlert database was styled STC. UNM v.
Intel Corp., No. 10-1077 (D.N.M. filed Nov. 15, 2010). I reviewed the complaint because the
University of New Mexico was listed as the patent's assignee. STC.UNM stands for the Science and
Technology Corporation of the University of New Mexico (the definition is nowhere in the
complaint). Its website provides more information than given in the complaint. See About Us,
STC.UNM, http://stc.unm.edu/about (last visited June 9, 2011). The site states:
STC.UNM (STC) is a nonprofit corporation formed by and owned entirely by the
University of New Mexico (UNM) (formed in 1995 by the Regents of UNM) to
protect and transfer its faculty inventions to the commercial marketplace. STC
licenses innovative technology developed at UNM, including optics, microfluidics,
and high performance materials as well as therapeutics, diagnostics, medical
devices, and drug discovery tools. We are a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation with
an independent board of directors. We work closely with UNM's Research and
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Most cases that turned up in the search results did not involve universities as
plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation.
Instead, many consisted of nonuniversity plaintiffs with the word research in their corporate names, or involved
other types of suits against universities (trademark infringement lawsuits were
common false positives).
After reviewing the search results, I used LexMachina and PACER to download
the complaint for each patent infringement lawsuit believed to be initiated by a
university, or to have a university as a plaintiff. 177 Upon inspection, several were
removed as not meeting the criteria for inclusion. 178 After these removals, a total of
N = 57 complaints meeting the inclusion criteria had been identified. A textual
review of these complaints then followed, as part of which I created an Excel

Technology Law (R&TL) office and the University Counsel's office in the
management and administration of their responsibilities.
Id. To the extent that other entities exist that commonly go by acronyms or other names with no
clear link to a university, they may have been missed in my search. This semantic technicality
raises a larger issue that bears further investigation: how many university affiliated research
entities commonly go by acronyms or other names that do not immediately signal an affiliation with
a university? So as to facilitate transparency in the activity of these groups, AUTM or another
industry leader should consider maintaining a publicly accessible list of the corporate and common
names of every university affiliated research entity along with its corresponding university.
177While at first appearing a distinction without a difference, "initiated by a university" and a
lawsuit that "has a university as a plaintiff' are overlapping but not identical concepts. Initiation
implies an affirmative decision to litigate, and not all cases that have universities as plaintiffs
necessarily carry that implication-in the situation, for example, of a university's being named as an
involuntary plaintiff. One located lawsuit involved precisely such a situation. See Complaint
12-14, BioTechnology, LLC v. CIBA Vision Corp., No. 09-3947 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 28, 2009)
(naming Drexel University-joint owner of the patents in suit-as both a defendant and an
involuntary plaintiff in the action and alleging that it was contractually obligated to cooperate fully
in any litigation involving the patents).
One also could argue that-even in cases where they are voluntary plaintiffs-universities
may not initiate such actions so much as they do participate in them, in the sense that universities'
licensees often identify the infringer and are the driving forces behind the actual infringement
lawsuits that get brought. However, because "university participation in patent infringement
litigation" also could include participation as defendants in such litigation, I have used "university

initiation of patent infringement litigation" to define the phenomenon of study, even though that
term, too, is subject to the aforementioned concern regarding universities as involuntary plaintiffs.
"University participation as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation" may be the most precise,
value-neutral description of the phenomenon, but it is also unwieldy to use.
178Removals included a declaratory judgment action brought by a university against two
faculty members, alleging failure to assign patent rights to the university; an action brought by a
university asking for an adjustment to a patent's term; two cases to correct inventorship; duplicates;
and cases without either a university or a university affiliated research entity as a plaintiff.
A continuation of the case that generated the largest jury verdict ever in a patent infringement
action also was removed. In April of 2007, Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. and New York University
sued Abbott Laboratories for patent infringement in the United States District Court of the Eastern
District of Texas. On December 18, 2009, the judge entered final judgment of a jury award of
$1,672,594,000 in actual damages and $175,641,661 in pre-judgment interest. See Judgment Order,
Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 07-0139 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2009). The judge then
severed plaintiffs' continuing causes of action for future damages accruing after the jury verdict,
ordering a new complaint to be filed, id., which plaintiffs filed on December 28, 2009. See
Complaint, Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 09-0389 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2009).
Because the December 28th complaint essentially is a continuation of the case filed in 2007, I
excluded it from the findings.
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spreadsheetl 7 9 with the following information: case number; the jurisdiction in
which the lawsuit was filed; the name of the lead plaintiff; the names and total
number of any co-plaintiffs; the names and total number of all defendants; the
number of patents alleged in the complaint; the general type of technology covered by
the patents in suit; the specific type of technology covered by the patents in suit; the
name of any lead outside counsel firm listed on the complaint as representing the
university; 8 0 whether the plaintiff(s) had demanded that the case be tried to a jury;
whether the plaintiff(s) sought monetary damages; and whether the lawsuit
appeared to have been filed in a strategic venue. 181 Descriptive and non-parametric
statistics were performed on the compiled data using statistical software, the results
of which are described in Part V.
The mixed methodology described above has one obvious limitation. Namely,
complaints in any type of lawsuit only tell one side of the litigation story. By looking
solely at the complaints in any given case (and not other pleadings, motions, or
docket entries), there is a risk of losing larger meanings and nuances that a more
robust review of each case might provide. While such a review would be possible, I
did not undertake it here for two reasons. First, with over fifty located cases, such a
review would have been time consuming and expensive. As many of the located cases
have docket entries numbering in the dozens if not the hundreds, downloading and
reviewing each filed document would have expanded the scope of the research
significantly. While reviewing all pleadings in each located case no doubt would have
provided for additional insights, ultimately I felt that such an undertaking was
better suited to follow-up research conducted on a case-by-case basis. Second, while
complaints may provide incomplete pictures of the nuances of individual cases, they
generally are uniform in what they do offer: concise descriptions of the alleged facts
deemed relevant by the plaintiffs. Because my research questions mostly concern
quantifying certain aspects of university initiated patent infringement litigation,
analyzing the publicly available, court-filed documents by which universities actually
commence those actions seemed the most fitting approach, particularly in light of the
resource constraints mentioned previously.
Additional qualitative approaches
toward understanding university initiation of patent infringement litigation should
be undertaken in subsequent research. 182

179Data from this spreadsheet are included as Appendix A to this article.
180 Names of local counsel were ignored.
181 I considered a lawsuit to have been filed in a strategic venue if it was filed in a state in
which no plaintiff or defendant in the case was alleged to be incorporated or alleged to have as its
principal place of business. My rationale was that decisions to sue in judicial districts of states in
which no plaintiff or defendant is located may reflect a strategic effort to obtain a favorable venue.
182 One potential avenue worth exploring is how the lawsuits identified in this article
concluded. Did they generate any written opinions that could elucidate further the nature of
university initiation of patent infringement litigation? How many cases persisted through trial,
which party won, and what did the victor win? For cases ending before trial, how did they conclude,
and if they settled, on what terms did they settle (if known)? What did universities and news media
say about these occurrences, if anything?
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V. FINDINGS

A. Quantitative Findings

1. Number of Patents
A total of 125 patents were alleged in the located lawsuits. The mean number of
patents alleged in a lawsuit was 2.19. The number of patents alleged in each lawsuit
ranged from 1 to 9, with most suits (75%) involving 1 or 2 patents. Table 1 provides
descriptive statistics and Table 2 identifies the frequencies.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics on Number of
Patents Alleged Per Lawsuit
N

Valid

57

Missing

Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Range
Minimum
Maximum

0
2.19
2.00
1
1.695
8
1
9

Table 2
Frequency of Number of Patents Alleged Per Lawsuit
Frequency
Valid

1
2
3
4
7
8
9
Total

Percent

24
19
5
6
1
1
1

42.1
33.3
8.8
10.5
1.8
1.8
1.8

57

100.0

Cumulative
Percent
42.1
75.4
84.2
94.7
96.5
98.2
100.0
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2. Number of Co-Plaintiffs
Most located cases (n = 26, or 4 5. 6 %) involved 1 co-plaintiff. However, there was
no co-plaintiff in 12 cases, meaning that universities initiated 21.1% of the located
lawsuits by themselves, without a co-plaintiff. Two lawsuits involved a university
and its affiliated research entity suing as co-plaintiffs. 1 83 Table 3 shows the full
frequencies.
Table 3
Frequencies of Number of Co-Plaintiffs Per Lawsuit
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

0

12

21.1

21.1

1
2
3
5

26
6
12
1

45.6
10.5
21.1
1.8

66.7
77.2
98.2
100.0

Total

57

100.0

3. Number of Defendants
Nearly 4 5% of all located cases (n = 25) were brought against just one defendant.
Additional frequencies are shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Frequencies of Number of Defendants Per Lawsuit
Frequency
Valid

1
2
3
4
7
11
13
Total

25
19
7
2
1
2
1
57

Percent
43.9
33.3
12.3
3.5
1.8
3.5
1.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
43.9
77.2
89.5
93.0
94.7
98.2
100.0

183See Univ. of Iowa v. Abbott Labs., No. 09-0099 (S.D. Iowa filed June 22, 2009); Cornell Univ.
v. Illumina, Inc., No. 01-0433 (D. Del. filed May 24, 2010).

[10:623 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

656

4. CorrelationsBetween Number of Patents, Co-Plaintiffs, and Defendants
The correlations between the number of patents alleged in a lawsuit, the
number of co-plaintiffs in a lawsuit, and the number of defendants in a lawsuit were
neither strong nor statistically significant, as illustrated in Table 5.
Table 5
Correlations Between Numbers of Patents,
Co-Plaintiffs, and Defendants Per Lawsuit

Spearman's
rho

No. of CoPlaintiffs

No. of CoPlaintiffs
1.000

No. of
Patents
.052

No. of
Defendants
-. 014

.

.700

.917

Correlation
Coefficient

.052

1.000

-. 057

Sig. (2-tailed)

.700

.

.672

-. 014

-. 057

1.000

.917

.672

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

No. of
Patents
No. of
Defendants

Correlation
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)

.

5. Types of Technology Litigated
More than half of the cases litigated (n = 32, or 56.1%) involved patents that
were directed toward pharmaceutical or medical technologies. Table 6 shows the
frequencies of the technology typologies.
Table 6
Frequencies of Type of Technology Litigated

Valid

chemical
drugs/medical
electrical/computer
mechanical
other - plant

Total

Frequency

Percent

5
32
12

8.8
56.1
21.1

7

12.3

1

1.8

57

100.0
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6. Venues
Located cases were filed in a wide variety of venues, as shown in Table 7. The
United States District Court of the District of Delaware was the most popular venue,
with 17 cases being filed there. The United States District Courts in New Jersey and
Massachusetts were the next favored venues, with 8 and 5 cases having been filed in
those courts, respectively.
Table 7
Frequency of Venues
Percent

IFrequency

Valid

C.D. Cal.
D. Del.
D. Mass.
D. Minn.
D. N.J.
D. N.M.
D. Neb.
D. Utah
E.D. Cal.
E.D. Pa.
E.D. Tex.
M.D. Ala.
M.D. N.C.
N.D. Cal.
N.D. Ill.
N.D. N.Y.
S.D. Cal.
S.D. Iowa
S.D. N.Y.
W.D. Pa.
W.D. Tex.
W.D. Wa.
W.D. Wisc.
Total

1
17
5
1
8
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
3
2
1
57

1.8
29.8
8.8
1.8
14.0
5.3
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
5.3
1.8
5.3
3.5
1.8
100.0
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7. Types of Licenses
All but 12 located complaints indicated whether the patents in suit were subject
to an exclusive or non-exclusive license, as indicated in Table 8. Three-quarters of
the complaints (n = 43, or 75.4%) involved patents that were alleged to have been

exclusively licensed, 184 while only 3 complaints alleged that the patents in suit were
subject to non-exclusive licenses.

Table 8
Frequencies of Licensing Types

Valid

exclusive
no allegation of practicing
non-exclusive
Total

Frequency
43

Percent

11
3
57

19.3
5.3
100.0

75.4

8. Use of Outside Counsel
Universities engaged outside counsel firms as their lead litigation counsel in all
but one of the located cases. 185 Marshall, Gerstein & Borun LLP was used as outside
counsel in more cases (n = 8, or 14.3%) than any other firm, although each of the
cases in which it was involved concerned abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA")
actions brought by Pfizer, Northwestern University, and others against generic
pharmaceutical companies attempting to make a generic version of Lyrica@. 186 Fish
& Richardson P.C. was the second-highest used outside counsel firm in the located
cases (n = 5, or 8 .9 %), and each of the cases in which it served as outside counsel
involved a different plaintiff. Table 9 identifies all lead outside counsel by frequency
of use.
184 One such complaint involved patents exclusively licensed by a university to its affiliated
research entity (Washington Research Foundation), which is the only plaintiff in the case.
Complaint, Wash. Research Found. v. Silicon Labs. Inc., No. 02-1050 (W.D. Wash. June 24, 2010).
The complaint also alleges that the exclusive licensee has sub-licensed use of the patents to various
companies. Id.
9, 12-13. For a discussion of this arrangement's implications, see infra
Part V.D.3.
185 In Biagro Western Sales, Inc. v. Turfgrass Management, Inc., No. 09-0178 (E.D. Cal. filed
Jan. 28, 2009), co-plaintiff Regents of the University of California listed an attorney from the
university's Office of the General Counsel as its attorney of record.
186See Pfizer Inc. v. Alphapharm Pty. Ltd., No. 01-0204 (D. Del. filed Mar. 12, 2010); Pfizer
Inc. v. Wockhardt Ltd., No. 03-2069 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 30, 2009); Pfizer v. Sandoz Inc., No. 03-2052
(D.N.J. filed Apr. 30, 2009); Pfizer Inc. v. Sun Pharm. Global Inc., No. 03-2070 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 30,
2009); Pfizer v. Lupin, Ltd., No. 01-0853 (D. Del. filed Oct. 6, 2010); Pfizer Inc. v. Cobalt Labs., Inc.,
No. 01-0315 (D. Del. filed Apr. 29, 2009); Pfizer Inc. v. Wockhardt Ltd., No. 01-0312 (D. Del. filed
Apr. 29, 2009); Pfizer Inc. v. Sun Pharm. Global Inc., No. 01-03 13 (D. Del. filed Apr. 29, 2009).
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Table 9
Frequency of Use of Outside Counsel By Firm

Valid

Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP
Blank Law & Technology P.S.
Choate, Hall & Stewart
Finnegan Henderson
Fish & Richardson P.C.
Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
Goodwin Procter LLP
Gunn, Lee & Cave, P.C.
Howrey LLP
Jones Day
K&L Gates LLP
Kirkland & Ellis LLP
Leydig, Voit & Mayer, Ltd.
Marshall, Gerstein & Borun LLP
Michael Mazza, LLC
Morriss O'Bryant Compagni, P.C.
Parsons Behle & Latimer
Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP
Perkins Coie LLP
Proskauer Rose LLP
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP
Satterlee Stephens Burke & Burke LLP
Shore Chan Bragalone DePumpo LLP
Stadheim & Grear, Ltd.
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
Wiley Rein LLP
Williams & Connolly LLP
Woodcock Washburn LLP
Total

Frequency
1
1
1
3
5
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
3
1
8
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
4
4
1
1
1
1
56

Percent
1.8
1.8
1.8
5.4
8.9
3.6
1.8
1.8
5.3
1.8
1.8
1.8
5.4
1.8
14.3
1.8
1.8
3.6
3.6
1.8
1.8
3.6
1.8
7.1
7.1
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
100.0

9. Damages Sought
The plaintiff or plaintiffs in the located cases requested that damages be
awarded (as opposed to requesting purely non-monetary forms of relief, such as
injunctive relief) in 61% of the located cases (n = 35). Each of the 22 cases where
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damages were not sought involved ANDAs, where by definition no commercial
manufacture of an allegedly infringing product had commenced.

10. Jury Demand
The plaintiff or plaintiffs in the located cases demanded that a jury (as opposed
to a judge) hear the patent infringement allegations in 60% of the located cases (n =
34). ANDA cases accounted for all but two of the 23 cases brought without a jury
demand. 187

B. Summary of QuantitativeFindings
Results revealed that universities asserted 125 different patents in 57 patent
infringement lawsuits filed by them in the two-year time period of study.
Universities sued in conjunction with at least one other plaintiff-a licensee-almost
50% of the time, although they sued as the only plaintiff in over a fifth of the
lawsuits. University-owned patents covering pharmaceutical and medical devices
were the most frequently litigated patents, having been litigated in over 50% of the
cases. The identified lawsuits were brought in a variety of venues, although the
Federal District Court of the District of Delaware-a district court located in a state
widely viewed as pro-business-was home to nearly a third of the located lawsuits.
Universities nearly always engaged outside counsel to litigate each of the identified
lawsuits. 188 Some of the identified law firms are intellectual property boutiques
(such as Fish & Richardson P.C.) or otherwise among the most respected-and highpriced-firms in the United States (such as Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher). Universities demanded that juries (as opposed to judges) hear
their infringement allegations in 6 0% of the cases, or generally whenever an ANDA
was not involved. Universities also requested that they be awarded monetary
damages (as opposed to purely non-monetary forms of relief) whenever possible.
Finally, only three of the identified cases contained an allegation that the university
had non-exclusively licensed the patents in suit. In all other cases, the university
either alleged that the patent in suit was subject to an exclusive license (75% of
cases) or made no allegation concerning whether or how the patent in suit was
licensed (19% of cases).
187The non-ANDA cases brought without a jury demand were STC. UNM v. Intel Corp., No. 011077 (D.N.M. filed Nov. 15, 2010) and Bayer HealthCare LLC v. Wedgewood Village Pharmacy, Inc.,
No. 01-5345 (D.N.J. filed Oct. 19, 2009).
188 When they sued in conjunction with one or more licensees, universities mostly used the
same outside counsel firm as their licensees. Only in twelve multiple-plaintiff cases did a complaint
list a university as having outside counsel different from the outside counsel used by the university's
licensee(s). Eight of those were the Pfizer/Northwestern University cases, where Marshall, Gerstein
& Borun LLP served as outside counsel to Northwestern University only. See supra note 186 and
accompanying text. The other four cases were AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Dako Denmark A/S, No. 0110396 (D. Mass. filed Mar. 13, 2009), Sirona Dental Systems Inc. v. Palodex Group Qy, No. 03-0266
(W.D. Wisc. filed Apr. 30, 2009), United States v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 10-5956 (D.N.J. filed Nov.
15, 2010), and Caliper Life Sciences, Inc. v. Carestream Health, Inc., No. 04-2079 (E.D. Tex. filed
Feb. 23, 2010).
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C. Implications from Quantitative Findings
This article's findings present interesting implications for university
involvement in patenting and technology transfer. First, the number of lawsuits
identified (N = 57) in the targeted two-year period suggests that university initiation
of patent infringement litigation is not an infrequent occurrence. If the number of
lawsuits identified in this study is typical for any given time period of similar
duration, one could expect that universities initiated roughly 285 lawsuits in the past
decade. While this number may seem small in the abstract, the total is more than
the total number of non-profit institutions engaged in technology transfer, 1 89
indicating that some universities are repeat initiators of patent infringement
litigation. 190 The monetary and non-monetary costs to universities that engage in
this activity is a research area that merits additional empirical investigation. 191
The findings also suggest that universities' behavior in patent infringement
litigation mimics the strategic behavior of for-profit actors involved in such litigation.
Universities in the located lawsuits preferred for juries rather than judges to hear
their claims. This preference could be styled a strategic, as studies show that juries
are more likely than judges to uphold a patent's validity, and "patent owners are
more likely to win a suit tried to a jury than a suit tried to a judge." 1 92 For-profit
actors also typically litigate in order to obtain damages as opposed to purely nonmonetary forms of relief, and this study's findings suggest that universities that
litigate their patents are similarly motivated. Finally, for-profit actors nearly always
engage outside counsel to represent them in patent infringement litigation (as
opposed to using in-house counsel), and universities again appear basically no
189 Approximately 160 to 190 research institutions have provided data to AUTM on their
technology transfer operations each year since 2000. See Licensing Surveys - AUTM, ASS'N OF
UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS,
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section= LicensingSurveys
AUTM&Template=/Tagge dPage/Tagge dPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID= 6&ContentlD= 2409 (last visited
June 9, 2011) (listing institutions in individual surveys from 2000-2009). Not all of these research
institutions, however, are universities as defined in this article, as some are non-profit research
institutions that do not grant degrees. For example, the Cleveland Clinic does not award degrees,

while

the

Mayo

Clinic

does.

See

CLEVELAND

CLINIC

LERNER

RESEARCH

INSTITUTE,

http://www.lerner.ccf.org
(last visited June
9, 2011);
MAYO
CLINIC:
Education,
http://www.mayo.edu/education (last visited June 9, 2011).
190 See Appendix A. The data presented in Appendix A bear out this assumption. For example,
Northwestern University was a co-plaintiff in eight located lawsuits. Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation was a co-plaintiff in five.
191While AUTM surveys non-profit research institutions on a yearly basis across several
metrics (revenue generated from licenses, number of patent applications filed, number of patents
issued, etc.) and publishes the results, it does not query members concerning involvement in patent
infringement litigation. In fact, a question concerning legal fees in the survey specifically excludes
any "significant litigation expenses." See AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: FY 2008, at 3,
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FY_2008_LicensingActivitySurvey&Template=/C
M/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=4218 (last visited June 9, 2011). Surveys conducted before 1999
did not contain this exclusion, which AUTM indicates "is intended to eliminate skews in the data as
a result of significant litigation." Id. at 4. Accordingly, AUTM's recent annual surveys are silent on
this important cost of university involvement in technology transfer. See also Rhoades, supra note
71, at 244 ("[T]he AUTM survey provides data on legal fees, but since 1999, these figures have only
included the costs of patent prosecution, and have not included major litigation fees of universities,
or the costs of university or externally hired attorneys who deal with technology transfer issues.").
192 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 40, at 3.
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different in this regard, even though most large universities have in-house counsel
who could represent them. The fact that outside counsel manifestly was involved in
all but one of the fifty-seven located lawsuits suggests that saving money on outside
counsel fees may not be a primary concern for universities that initiate patent
infringement litigation.
Another implication that flows from the quantitative data is that patent
infringement litigation brought by universities is likely to involve exclusively
licensed patents. Potentially adding to the suggested limitations of exclusive licenses
brokered by universities, 1 93 the prevalence of litigated patents that are exclusively
licensed may mean that universities and consumers bear additional costs when
universities engage in this form of licensure. As to why non-exclusively licensed
patents appear rarely litigated, one possibility is that such patents are less valuable
to the university, and thus not worth the cost of enforcement. One also could
imagine that universities may be reluctant to sue over non-exclusively licensed
patents because the mere act of doing so could jeopardize the university's royalty
stream for those patents, particularly if the university ends up losing the case. Nonexclusive licensees also are unlikely to be contractually obligated to contribute to the
litigation costs of the licensed patents. Accordingly, the prospect of having to pay for
litigation with no hope for reimbursement could diminish a university's enthusiasm
for pursuing a case involving a non-exclusive license. 1 94
Additional research should investigate to what extent the exclusive or nonexclusive nature of a licensed patent affects a university's calculus in deciding
whether to initiate litigation over that patent. Also meriting further consideration is
university initiation of patent infringement litigation over non-licensed patents. Ten
located lawsuits were (1) brought by a university without a co-plaintiff, and (2)
contain no allegation in the complaint that the university that owns the patent is
practicing it. Lawsuits of this sort should be closely examined to gain better
understanding of universities' goals and motivations in bringing lawsuits without the
participation of licensees. If no licensees exist in such instances, universities' pursuit
of the lawsuits anyway may indicate a purely rents-driven approach to technology
transfer, or a breakdown in the licensing negotiation process (i.e., the university sues
a would-be licensee because it is practicing the patented technology but declined to
take a license from the university).
Either scenario presents unique policy
considerations for university activity in this space.

D. Textual Findings
Textual examination of the located complaints provides for additional insights
into university initiation of patent infringement litigation in strategic venues, the
relationship between university patent owners and their licensees, and the
relationship between universities and their affiliated research entities. It also gives
enhanced perspective into situations where universities and students compete.
193 See

supra Part II.B.2.
194Alternative billing arrangements, such as bringing a lawsuit on a contingency fee basis,
could lessen a university's legal costs. Unfortunately, the prevalence of contingency fee and other
alternative billing arrangements among universities that litigate patents is unknown.
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1. Litigation in Strategic Venues
At least six lawsuits appear to have been filed in what could be called
strategically selected venues. In Shotspotter, Inc. v. Safety Dynamics, Inc., 1 95 lead
plaintiff Shotspotter, Inc. alleges to be incorporated in Delaware and have its
principal place of business in California. 196 Co-plaintiff Johns Hopkins University is
both incorporated and located in Maryland, and the lone defendant allegedly is
incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Arizona. 197 In short, the only tie to
the Southern District of New York is that the plaintiffs allege that the defendant has
committed infringing acts in that judicial district. 198 The choice to file suit in New
York may reflect a strategic decision to litigate in a forum where presiding judges are
believed to be knowledgeable about patents and sympathetic to owners of intellectual
property.
Similar to Johns Hopkins in its strategic selection of venue, Georgia-based
Emory University selected or consented in the selection (by its co-plaintiff) of the
Southern District of New York as the district court in which to litigate patent
infringement claims against Teva Pharmaceuticals, despite any apparent connections
to New York. 199 Emory's co-plaintiff, Gilead Sciences, Inc., allegedly is incorporated
in Delaware and headquartered in California. 200 The two Teva defendants allegedly
are incorporated and/or based in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Israel.201
Abbott Laboratories-along with co-plaintiff Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation ("WARF")-brought two cases in the United States District Court of the
District of Delaware against generic drug manufacturers that (along with the
plaintiffs) were neither incorporated nor based in Delaware. 202 The United States
government (acting through the National Institutes of Health) and the University of
Illinois likewise chose Delaware as the venue for their ANDA action against generic
drug manufacturers Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
even though no party to the case was alleged to be incorporated or located in that
state. 203 Like the parties that selected the Southern District of New York as the
venue of their suits, it is conceivable that the plaintiffs in the aforementioned
lawsuits made a strategic decision to litigate in Delaware under the belief that the
courts there are more favorable to intellectual property holders. As described in Part
V.A.6. above, universities were plaintiffs in more lawsuits in Delaware than in any
other venue during the studied time period. 204

195No. 09-7828 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 11, 2009).
196 Complaint
1, Shotspotter, Inc. v. Safety Dynamics, Inc., No. 09-7828 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11,
2009).
197Id. T 2-3.
198 Id.
6.
199See Complaint, Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 10-1798 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2010).2
00Id. 2.
201Id.
4-5.
202 See Complaint
2-5, Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 09-0215 (D. Del. Apr. 1, 2009);
Complaint
2-4, Abbott Labs. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., No. 10-0998 (D. Del. Nov. 19, 2010).
203 See Complaint
2-6, United States v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., No. 10-5956 (D.N.J. Nov. 15,
2010).
204 See supra Part V.A.6 tbl.7.
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In each of the five cases discussed above, the plaintiffs based their claims of
personal jurisdiction on the allegation that the defendants had sold infringing
products in the state where the lawsuit was filed, regularly transacted business
within that state, and/or previously consented to personal jurisdiction in other
lawsuits in that state. But even if the personal jurisdiction bar is met, venue may
not be proper, causing the strategic selection to backfire.
Stanford University
experienced this when it filed suit in conjunction with its licensee and the licensee's
subsidiary in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Texas, 2 05 a
judicial district increasingly known for its speed and efficiency in resolving patent
infringement lawsuits. 206 Stanford is based in California, its licensee and subsidiary
are incorporated in Delaware and based in Massachusetts, and the defendant was
alleged to have its headquarters in New York.207 After answering the complaint,
PACER docket entries show that the defendant moved to transfer the case to the
Northern District of California, the federal judicial district in which Stanford is
located. The parties subsequently stipulated to the transfer, and the case is now
pending in California.

2. Relationships Between University Patent Owners and Licensees
Not all relationships between universities and their licensees go smoothly. A
licensee one day can become a defendant the next, as illustrated by Massachusetts
Institute of Technology v. Still River Systems, Inc., where the defendant allegedly
failed to meet certain contractual milestones, leading the university to terminate its
license. 208 Similarly, a university and an exclusive licensee may find that a current
or former licensee has breached the terms of its license. For example, in AsymmetRx,
Inc. v. Dako Denmark A/S, Harvard and its exclusive licensee AsymmetRx alleged
that a non-exclusive licensee-with authority pursuant to its license to sell products
covered by the patents in suit for research uses only-had entered the exclusive
licensee's exclusive field of use, thereby infringing its patent rights. 209
The AsymmetRx case raises an important question: must a university join its
exclusive licensee in bringing a patent infringement action? If universities would
prefer not to initiate patent infringement litigation (or should avoid such litigation,
as some have argued), why not let their exclusive licensees bring such actions
205 See Complaint, Caliper Life Scis., Inc. v. Carestream Health, Inc., No. 10-2079 (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 23, 2010).
206 See The Eastern District of Texas: A Magnet for Patent Litigation, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNS., Sept. 1, 2006, at 53, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/September/
53.pdf. According to LexMachina, the mean time to termination for patent infringement lawsuits
filed in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Texas is 479 days, and nearly
2,000 patent infringement cases have been filed there since 2000, the second highest among all
federal judicial districts. See LEX MACHINA, http://www.lexmachina.com (last visited June 9, 2011).
207 Complaint
4-6, Caliper Life Scis., supra note 205.
208 Complaint
19-20, Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Still River Sys., Inc., No. 10-12225 (D. Mass.
Dec. 23, 2010). See also Complaint
15-20, STC.UNM v. Envtl. Robots, Inc., No. 10-0094 (D.N.M.
Feb. 4, 2010) (alleging breach of contract for failure to pay royalties pursuant to non-exclusive
license).
209 Complaint
14-15, 18-19, AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Dako Denmark A/S, No. 09-10396 (D.
Mass. Mar. 13, 2009).
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without them? While such a solution might serve policy goals, the law offers no
helpful distinction between university owners of patents and for-profit owners of
patents. Both can be patentees under the Patent Act, which defines patentee as
including "not only the patentee to whom the patent was issued but also the
successors in title to the patentee." 210 As AsymmetRx learned in a separate lawsuit
before joining with Harvard in bringing the above described action against Dako
Denmark, determining who is a successor in title to the patentee requires looking at
any licenses granted by "the patentee to whom the patent was issued" and assessing
whether they constitute an intention to assign "all substantial rights" to the patent,
or merely an intention to license its use. 211 The CAFC has indicated that all
substantial rights are not assigned when the patentee retains the right to initiate
litigation on its own; 212 however, insisting on being informed of any lawsuit brought
by a licensee, or contracting to receive portions of damages recovered in infringement
suits, are not provisions that, by themselves, mean that all substantial rights were
not conveyed. 213 Determining who has the right to "indulge infringements" is
particularly dispositive in analyzing if a license is merely a license or is actually an
assignment of all substantial rights in the patent. 214
A textual review of the complaints revealed that many universities that co-sued
with exclusive licensees alleged that the licensees had the contractual ability to sue
"in their own name," yet the universities had joined the suits anyway. For example,
in Stanford's case against Carestream, plaintiffs alleged that co-plaintiff "Xenogen
licenses the [patents in suit] pursuant to an exclusive license agreement with
Stanford. The license agreement authorizes Xenogen to bring suit in its own name to
enforce the [patents in suit]." 21 5 Despite this purported agreement, Xenogen did not
bring suit alone. 216 Stanford is a co-plaintiff. Similar language appears in the
complaints of other located cases. 2 17 Notwithstanding this language and apparent
210 See 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (2006).
211See AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[T]he
critical determination regarding a party's ability to sue in its own name is whether an agreement
transferring patent rights to that party is, in effect, an assignment or a mere license."); Vaupel
Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also
Jeffrey L. Newton, Assuring All Substantial Rights in Exclusive Patent Licenses, 44 LES NOUVELLES

235, 235 (2009) ("Despite their best of intentions, parties draft license agreements which purport to
have the patentee grant sufficient rights for a licensee to assert a patent against third parties, but
fail to grant all substantial rights to sue.").
212 See AsymmetRx, 582 F.3d at 1320-21 (finding that university patent owner did not convey
entire right to enforce patents to licensee when it retained the right to sue infringers if licensee
declined to do so, required licensee to consider university's "views and the public interest" in
determining whether to bring an infringement action, maintained the right to approve any
settlement, and maintained the right to join as a co-plaintiff in any action brought by the licensee).
213 See Vaupel, 944 F.2d at 875 (finding that retained rights by patent owner to veto any
sublicensing, obtain patents on the invention in other countries, and receive a share of damages
from any infringement action were not inconsistent with an assignment).
214 See Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that
although licensee had the option to initiate lawsuit for infringement, because licensor also
maintained such right "it does not enjoy the right to indulge infringements, which normally
accompanies a complete conveyance of the right to sue").
215 Complaint 5, Caliper Life Scis., supra note 205.
2

161d4

217 See, e.g., Complaint

22, Gilead, supra note 199 ("Pursuant to an agreement entered into
between Gilead and Emory, Gilead has substantial rights in the [patents in suit], including but not
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authorization from the universities to "go it alone," universities joined their exclusive
licensees in suit in each instance, likely out of an abundance of caution. 21 8
Further research remains to be conducted concerning universities that sue in
conjunction with exclusive licensees, as well as exclusive licensees that sue without
the universities to which the patents were originally assigned. 219 Questions to be
explored include what do licensing contracts say about which party pays for the
litigation in these relationships, which manages the litigation strategy, which selects
the outside counsel, and which has ultimate authority to determine if and how to
settle a case short of trial? On what issues are the contracts silent, and how have
limited to, rights associated with being a licensee of the [patents in suit], and the right to sue for
infringement of the [patents in suit]."); Complaint
13, Shotspotter, supra note 195 ("ShotSpotter
has the right to sue for and obtain equitable relief and damages for infringement of the [patent in
suit]."); Complaint 10, AsymmetRx, supra note 209 ("AsymmetRx is the exclusive licensee of the
[patents in suit] in the commercial diagnostic field and has the right to prosecute in its own name
any infringement of these patents within the diagnostic field."); Complaint
13, Brigham Young
Univ. v. Hitachi High Techs. Am., Inc., No. 09-0302 (D. Utah Apr. 7, 2009) ("On March 19, 2008, by
written agreement, BYU granted [co-plaintiff] Torion an exclusive license to make, manufacture,
use, sell, and otherwise practice the inventions described in the [patent in suit]. The agreement
grants Torion the right to enforce the [patent in suit] as well."); Complaint 11, Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Neb. v. Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics Inc., No. 09-3075 (D. Neb. Apr. 20, 2009) ("The
University has granted an exclusive license to the Patents-in-Suit to [co-plaintiff] UNeMed, which
has given an exclusive sublicense to the Patents-in-Suit to Abbott Laboratories. UNeMed has
authority to bring this action pursuant to its sublicense with Abbott Laboratories."); Complaint 9,
Sirona Dental Sys. Inc. v. Palodex Group Oy, No. 09-0266 (W.D. Wisc. Apr. 30, 2009) ("Among
Sirona's rights as exclusive licensee is the sole authority to enforce the [patent in suit] in the Field,
including without limitation the sole authority to initiate, conduct and conclude legal proceedings.").
218 The opposite was true in one located case, BioTechnology, LLC,, where Drexel University
allegedly had agreed to "cooperate fully . . . in any litigation involving any patent" it licensed to
BioTechnology, yet refused to join as a co-plaintiff in the lawsuit. See Complaint 19, BioTechology,
supra note 177. BioTechnology relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 to join Drexel
University in the action, despite its recalcitrance, as the CAFC has suggested is appropriate to do in
such situations. Id. 20; see AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (discussing the potential appropriateness of involuntary joinder of university patent
licensors).
219

Such lawsuits do exist. See, e.g., Complaint

1, 12-16, Nanosys, Inc. v. Sigma-Aldrich

Corp., No. 09-0258 (W.D. Wisc. Apr. 27, 2009) (lawsuit brought by exclusive licensee of five patents
owned by Massachusetts Institute of Technology; alleges licensee "has the right to recover for
infringement" of each patent in suit); Complaint
8-10, Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Ambry
Genetics Corp., No. 09-40202 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 2009) (lawsuit brought by exclusive licensee of
patent owned by Baylor University; alleges licensee has "the right to initiate actions against
infringers of the [patent in suit] in [its own] name and to join Baylor as a party-plaintiff if legally
required to do so"); Complaint
9-10, Direct Electron, LP v. FEl Co., No. 09-2845 (S.D. Cal. Dec.
18, 2009) (lawsuit brought by exclusive licensee of patent owned by the Regents of the University of
California; alleges licensee "is authorized under the exclusive license agreement to enforce the
patent-in-suit including the right to sue and collect damages"); Complaint
19, 46-48,
NeuroGrafix v. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., No. 10-1990 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010) (lawsuit
brought by sub-licensee of exclusive licensee of patent originally owned by the University of
Washington; alleges sub-licensee is authorized "to enforce the [patent in suit] and sue infringers for
past and present infringement"); Complaint
18, 20, Rapid Mobile Techs., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
No. 10-62504 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2010) (lawsuit brought by exclusive licensee-controlled by patent's
inventor-of patent owned by the University of Florida Research Foundation, Inc.; alleges licensee
has "the right to police and enforce the parameters of the [patent in suit] through any legal means,
including but not limited to, though [sic] the filing of a patent infringement lawsuit such as the
instant one").
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TTOs and licensees interpreted these contracts in the face of litigation? While
answers to these questions can be conjectured through speculation and anecdote,
empirical data would provide much needed insight into the complex and varied
relationships between universities and their licensees.

3. Relationships Between Universities and Affiliated Research Entities
A textual examination of the located complaints also reveals perplexing nuances
concerning the relationship between universities and their closely affiliated research
entities. Such entities can shield universities from liability and allow them to engage
in certain business activities without jeopardizing their tax-exempt status. 220 They
also historically have served as buffer organizations for "technology transfer
activities that are less consistent with the traditional missions of the university, less
in tune with the prevailing academic culture, and less consonant with the public
image of the functions appropriate for a university." 221 Assuming that one of the
purposes of a closely affiliated research entity is to have it conduct business activities
that the university itself either cannot or would rather not conduct, one might
speculate that a university and its closely affiliated research entity would never join
forces and sue as co-plaintiffs.
Yet such lawsuits do occur, as revealed by two discovered in this study. In
University of Iowa v. Abbott Laboratories,222 both the university and its affiliated
research entity (the University of Iowa Research Foundation ("UIRF")) are named as
plaintiffs, although UIRF, and not the University of Iowa, is the sole owner of the
patents in suit. 223 The complaint describes UIRF and its purpose as follows:
UIRF is a 501(c)(3) corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Iowa with its principal place of business at 2660 University Capital Centre,
Iowa City, Iowa 52242-5500. Although separately incorporated in 1975, the
UIRF is an affiliated organization of the University and acts as an
instrumentality of the University by performing functions that the
University would itself ordinarily carry out. Specifically, the University has
designated the UIRF as the owner of its patent rights and manager of its
interests in qualifying inventions. Pursuant to this designation, the UIRF
is organized and operates to support the research and educational missions
of the University by taking ownership of University-invented technologies
and then transferring them to the marketplace for the benefit of the
University, its inventors, the State of Iowa, and society at large. Through
the commercialization of University intellectual property and the formation
of new business ventures to support those technologies, the UIRF also

220 MVATKIN, supra note
221 Id. at 307.

4, at 107.

222 No. 09-0099 (S.D. Iowa filed June 22, 2009).
223

Id
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serves a key role in the University's efforts to support and enhance
economic development in the State of Iowa. 224
The above paragraph is intriguing in the level of detail it provides. Whether
UIRF benefits "society at large" and furthers economic development in the state of
Iowa are not likely to be contested issues in the litigation. Accordingly, one questions
the need and purpose of including such laudatory language in the complaint. 225
In Cornell University v. Illumina, Inc., 226 Cornell University's affiliated research
entity, Cornell Research Foundation, Inc., joined the university as a plaintiff in the
lawsuit. The research entity, and not the university, is an assignee of each of the
patents in suit (curiously, so are the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University and Agricultural and Mechanical College and the Regents of the
University of Minnesota, although neither is party to the lawsuit or mentioned in the
complaint).
The complaint describes the research entity as "a wholly owned
subsidiary of Cornell University, whose mission is to manage the intellectual
property invented by Cornell University employees under Cornell University's
Inventions and Related Property Rights Policy, including obtaining patent,
trademark, or copyright protection where appropriate and licensing intellectual
property for commercial development and use." 227
While the Cornell and University of Iowa cases offer no obvious explanation as to
why the universities and their affiliated research entities jointly sued in those cases,
other cases involving university affiliated research entities provide further
noteworthy descriptions of these organizations and insight into their relationships
with their affiliated universities. For example, the role of Washington Research
Foundation ("WRF")-the research entity affiliated with the University of
Washington-is described as follows in Washington Research Foundation v. Silicon
LaboratoriesInc.: 228
Washington Research Foundation (also referred to as "WRF") is an
independent nonprofit Washington State 501(c)(3) organization based in
Seattle, Washington. Washington Research Foundation was created in
1981 and is mandated by federal statute to review technology disclosures by
the University of Washington and other Washington research institutions,
obtain protection for such technology through patents, copyrights, or other
means, and provide for the license, sale, or other exploitation of such
technology.
The activities of the WRF are funded by revenue from
technology licensing and the investment of retained funds. Washington
Research Foundation has benefited Washington State research institutions
by licensing a variety of technologies to industry, including the basis for a
hepatitis B virus vaccine, blood clotting factors, recombinant insulin, and
224

Id.

7.

225 This complaint also is interesting in that it is the only one located that was signed by an

assistant attorney general acting as local counsel for the plaintiffs. Id. at 10. Perhaps the manifest
involvement of a state agency in the filing of the lawsuit explains the curious preemptive defense of
UIRF and its activities.
226 No. 10-433 (D. Del. filed May 24, 2010).
227 Complaint 2, Cornell Univ. v. Illumina, Inc., No. 10-433 (D. Del. May 24, 2010).
228 No. 10-1050 (W.D. Wa. filed June 24, 2010).
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Washington Research Foundation provides support through gifts and
grants for scholarship and research to the University of Washington. Such
gifts and licensing disbursements have totaled more than $280 million, thus
providing a substantial return on investment to the taxpayers whose dollars
support this institution.
The gifts from the Washington Research
Foundation have supported the creation of over 100 endowments for chairs,
professorships, research fellowships and graduate stipends in science,
medicine and engineering, all at reduced or no cost to the taxpayer.
Educational programs created and supported by the Washington Research
Foundation include the Center for Technology Entrepreneurship
(University of Washington Business School) and the Program for
Technology Commercialization (University of Washington Bioengineering),
all of which substantially benefit society and improve the human condition.
The Washington Research Foundation was a founding supporter of
technology "gap" funding programs at the University of Washington, the
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, and Washington State
University. 229
At issue in this lawsuit is low intermediate frequency radio frequency receiver
technology invented by a faculty inventor at the University of Washington who
assigned his patents to the University of Washington, not WRF. 230 The University of
Washington, in turn, exclusively licensed the patents in suit to WRF "to include in its
patent licensing program and, if necessary, to enforce in the name of the Washington
Research Foundation all rights available in law and equity under the [patents in
suit] including the right to sue for infringement and collect damages therefor." 231
The complaint mentions WRF's having consummated sub-licenses with a variety of
low intermediate frequency radio chipset companies, including Toshiba and
Ericsson. 232 WRF is the only plaintiff in the lawsuit. 233
The assignment and licensing structure in Washington Research Foundation
would seem to reflect an intentional decision by the university not to have to involve
itself directly in any enforcement activity. However, just four months later, the
University of Washington sued an alleged infringer without the involvement of WRF
over patents to which it was again the sole assignee. 234 From reading the two
complaints, no explanation is readily apparent as to why the university is involved in
one case but not the other.
A consistent decision not to be involved in any litigation may exist at the
University of New Mexico, where in two located cases it owned the patents in suit but
229 Complaint
2-3, Wash. Research Found. v. Silicon Labs. Inc., No. 10-1050 (W.D. Wa.
June 24, 2010). For a description of the "mandate" referenced in the complaint, see discussion infra
accompanying
note 246.
2

30Id

6.

Id. 8
232 Id.
12.
2
33d.124.
234 See Complaint, Univ. of Wash. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 10-1933 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2010).
231
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was not named a plaintiff in either. 235 Interestingly, language in both complaints
seems to suggest that there may be little distinction between the university and its
affiliated research entity that is actually the lone plaintiff in the lawsuits. Both
complaints describe the research entity as "a nonprofit corporation formed by and
owned entirely by the University of New Mexico" 236 and "formed in 1995 by the
Regents of the University to protect and transfer its faculty inventions to the
commercial marketplace." 237
In both Washington Research Foundation and the two cases involving the
University of New Mexico's affiliated research entity, the sequential patent
inventor assigns patent to
assignment and licensing structure is as follows:
university; university exclusively licenses patent to affiliated research entity;
university affiliated research entity presumably issues sub-licenses to industry. This
3-layered assignment/licensing structure differs from the 2-layered structure existing
in other located cases involving a university affiliated research entity as plaintiff.
The faculty inventor in such cases assigns an invention directly to the university's
affiliated research entity, without involving the university. For example, in Abbott
Laboratories v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., 238 the faculty inventors of the
patents in suit assigned the patents directly to WARF, not the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. 239 The university is not a party to the lawsuit, although its
relationship with WARF is described in the complaint as follows:
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF") is a nonprofit
Wisconsin corporation, having its principal place of business at 614 Walnut
Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53726. WARF is the designated technology
transfer
organization
for the
University
of Wisconsin-Madison
("University"). WARF's mission is to support research at the University, to
transfer technology, and to ensure that the inventions and discoveries of the
University benefit humankind. WARF carries out this mission by patenting
and licensing University inventions and by returning a portion of the
proceeds of that licensing to fund additional research at the University. To
date, WARF's contributions to the University have included funds to
support research, build facilities, purchase land and equipment, and
provide many faculty and graduate student fellowships. 240
Similarly, the university affiliated research entities in Research Foundation of
State University of New York v. Bruker Corp.241 and Bayer Healthcare, LLC v.
235 Compare Complaint
1-2, Sci. & Tech. Corp. of the Univ. of N.M. v. Toshiba Am. Elec.
Components, Inc., No. 09-0310 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2009), with Complaint
1-3, STC.UNM v. Intel
Corp., 10-1077 (D.N.M. Nov. 15, 2010).
236 Complaint
1, Sci. & Tech. Corp., supra note 235; Complaint
1, STC. UNM, supra note
235.
237 Complaint
2, Sci. & Tech. Corp., supra note 235; Complaint 2, STC. UNM, supra note
235.
238 No. 09-0884 (D. Del. filed Nov. 19, 2009).
239 Complaint
20, Abbott Labs. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., No. 09-0884 (D. Del. Nov. 19,
2009).24
0Id. 3.
241 No. 09-007 1 (N.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 21, 2009).
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Wedgewood Village Pharmacy, Inc., 242 and not their affiliated universities, are the
assignees of the patents in those lawsuits. The affiliated universities (SUNY and the
University of Kentucky, respectively) are not plaintiffs in those lawsuits, let alone
even described in the complaints.
Whether a 3-layered assignment/licensing structure (inventor 4 university 4
affiliated research entity) or 2-layered structure (inventor 4 affiliated research
entity) ultimately is more beneficial for universities would appear to depend on what
their goals are for adopting one structure over another. Each structure's tax
implications are complicated and likely relevant to a university's decision. While IRS
rulings indicate that royalties from licensing patents are not considered unrelated
business income for federal tax purposes, the agency "has not provided much
guidance on whether technology transfer and commercialization activities will
jeopardize an organization's tax-exempt status." 243 Whether those activities are
orchestrated out of the university (which is presumptively tax-exempt), a supporting
organization to the university (also presumptively tax-exempt), or a for-profit
subsidiary of either entity could affect the tax treatment. 244 Unfortunately the
agency's private letter rulings on this subject have been varied and situation
specific. 24 5 Although Congress enacted an amendment to the tax code in 1986
intended to establish the tax-exempt status of certain research entities, the provision
was drafted so narrowly as to apply only to WRF. 246
The 2-layered structure may grow in popularity as universities increasingly
"outsource" their TTOs to report directly to affiliated foundations and research
entities. 247 For those institutions concerned with being viewed as litigious, the 2layered structure would appear to offer universities greater leeway to engage in
patent infringement litigation without appearing-on paper, at least-directly
engaged in such activity.

4. When Universities and Students Compete
A final interesting finding from the textual review of the located complaints
comes from Auburn University's lawsuit against IBM. 248 This case touches on the
No. 09-5345 (D.N.J. filed Oct. 19, 2009).
243 Cerny & Hellmuth, supra note 44, at 11.
244 See id. at 6-15.
245
1d. at 11-12.
242

246 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1605(a)(4), 100 Stat. 2085, 2769 (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2006)) (applying only to organizations "incorporated on July 20,
1981").
247 For example, the University of Arizona announced in November of 2010 that it was
establishing a nonprofit corporation to handle the commercialization efforts previously managed by
its TTO. See U-Arizona to convert its TTO into a nonprofit, TECH. TRANSFER TACTICS (Nov. 3, 2010),

http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2010/11/03/u-arizona-to-convert-its-tto-into-a-

nonprofit. The new entity is named the University of Arizona Research Corporation and operates
under the auspices of the University of Arizona Foundation. Id. The university's executive vice
president and provost said the new structure offers greater flexibility to work with faculty on ideas
and to develop relationships with companies. Id. Why that flexibility was diminished when the
TTO reported through internal academic channels went unreported.
248 Complaint, Auburn Univ. v. Int'l Bus. Machs., Corp., No. 09-0694 (M.D. Ala. July 23, 2009).
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blurring between public and proprietary research as discussed by Rhoten and
Powell. 24 9 It helps explain how such activity occurs, how students as well as faculty
are involved in it, and what such blurring might mean for universities.
The case centers around a professor of electrical engineering at Auburn, his
former graduate student, and their relationship with IBM. 250 According to the
complaint, the professor and graduate student jointly conducted research aimed at
devising a method for classifying computer components based on expected reliability
and estimating the reliability of those components based on the classification. 251
Inventions flowed from this research for which Auburn applied for patents in 2001.252
The applications listed the professor, Dr. Singh, and his graduate student, Mr.
Barnett, as co-inventors. 253 Around this time, IBM asked Dr. Singh whether Mr.
Barnett would be interested in spending the summer at IBM. 254 Implicit in the
complaint is that Dr. Singh, as a leader in his field, had some prior existing
relationship with IBM.
Mr. Barnett accepted IBM's invitation and ended up spending the summer at
IBM's office in Burlington, Vermont. 255 He then returned to his studies at Auburn. 256
After Mr. Barnett returned to Auburn, IBM filed its own patent applications for
technology similar to the technology that Dr. Singh and Mr. Barnett had invented
and for which Auburn had recently filed its own patent applications. 257 Mr. Barnett
was listed as a co-inventor, along with IBM personnel, on the patent applications
filed by IBM. 258 Dr. Singh was not listed as a co-inventor. 259 Auburn's applications
matured into the patents that form the basis of its infringement complaint. 260 IBM's
applications matured into patents as well.26 1 In addition to its claims of patent
infringement, Auburn also alleges unjust enrichment and conversion of its
intellectual property by IBM. 262
Auburn's complaint does not specify whether Mr. Barnett completed his Ph.D. at
Auburn, or where he might be if he is no longer a student there. One can only
imagine that his summer in Burlington was more eventful than his advisor had
hoped. Whether Auburn potentially had a viable cause of action against Mr. Barnett
under conversion or any other legal theory is unknown. One can speculate, though,
that a decision by Auburn to sue its current or former student would have been
viewed critically by many, whatever the legal merits of such action. Auburn may
have decided not to pursue any claim it might have had against Mr. Barnett for that
reason alone. But assuming the future occurrence of situations such as this one at
other institutions, and given faculty and universities' financial stakes in patenting, is
See Rhoten & Powell, supra note 72.
250 See Complaint, Auburn Univ., supra note 248.
251 See id.
2-5.
252 Id.
20.
253 Id.
254 Id.
22.
255 Id.
23.
256 Id.
24.
257 Id.
26-27.
2
58 Id. 28.
259 Id.
260 Id.
20, 31.
261 Id.
26-27.
262 Id.
43-50.
249
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it unreasonable to think that the day of universities suing current students over their
inventions might not be too far off?263

VI. CONCLUSION
Much remains to be learned about university initiation of patent infringement
litigation. This article represents, however, a useful first step toward gaining
empirical understanding of the phenomenon, its extent, its contours, and its
complexities as part of a broader effort to provide a transparent accounting of
university engagement in patenting and technology transfer.26 4 As universities
continue to seek revenues through patenting in an era of dwindling public funding
for higher education, the appeal of initiating infringement actions over universityowned patents is only likely to grow in popularity. All the more reason for TTOs,
scholars, and policymakers to consider proactively the complex issues raised by the
activity.

263 In fact, the day already may have arrived.
According to a widely publicized story in
January of 2011, the University of Missouri purportedly demanded a 25% ownership stake and 2/3
of any profits generated from an iPhone app created by a current student at the university in March
of 2009, while he was a student at the university. See Alan Scher Zagier, Young Inventors Prompt
Colleges
to
Revamp
Rules,
SEATTLE
TIMES,
Jan.
24,
2011,
available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2014021707_apusstudentinventors.html; see also
iPhone App Raises Questions About Who Owns Student Inventions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 31,
2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/iphone-app-raises-questions-about-who-owns-studentinventions. Apparently the app-which aids in tracking local apartment rentals-has been quite
successful, generating over 250,000 downloads. Although the university relented in its demands,
the Seattle Times article noted that the situation raises the question of "[w]ho owns the patents and
copyrights when a student creates something of value on campus, without a professor's help?"

Zagier, supra.

The answer largely will depend on the wording of an institution's intellectual

property policy and the circumstances in which it applies to students, if at all.
To date, some universities have shown no hesitancy to pursue former professors and students
when the stakes are high enough. For example, in 2008, St. John's University sued a retired
professor and Ph.D. graduate of the university for allegedly failing to assign patentable inventions
discovered while both were at the university. See Former Professor Fails to Dismiss St. John's Suit
Over
'Secret'
Patent,
TECH.
TRANSFER
TACTICS
(Dec.
29,
2010),
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2010/12/29/former-professor-fails-to-dismiss-stjohns-suit-over- %E2%80 % 98secret%E2%80%99-patent.
The retired professor and his former
graduate student had formed a start-up company and applied for various patents (which they
received) after each had left the university. Id. Portions of the former graduate student's
dissertation apparently appeared in one of the patent applications. Id. The start-up company
allegedly licensed the patents for at least $100 million, 30% of which the university claims it is
owed. Id. The judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case in December of 2010,
allowing the university's claims of fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and
breach of fiduciary duty to go forward. See St. John's Univ. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 194
(E.D.N.Y. 2010).
264 See Rhoades, supra note 11, at 244 ("Rather than a full accounting of costs as well as
revenues, there is an effort to track mostly the credit side of the accounting ledger, monitoring the
growth of activities and revenues, but not assessing the net gains.").
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Case No.

1:09cv71

1:09cv178

0:09cv541

Date Filed

1/21/2009

1/28/2009

3/6/2009

Court

N.D. N.Y.

E.D. Cal.

D. Minn.

Lead
Plaintiff

The Research
Foundation of
State University
of New York

Biagro Western
Sales, Inc.

Mayo Foundation
for Medical
Education and
Research

The Regents of
the University of
California
CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged
License Type
Seeks
DeesYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

Bruker Corp.;
Bruker Biospin
GmBh; Bruker
Biospin Corp.;
Varian, Inc.

1

Turfgrass
Management, Inc.
d/b/a Grigg
Brothers; Baicor
L.C.

2

Shore Chan
Bragalone LLP

4
no allegation of
patcn
practicing

no allegation of
prciigexclusive
practicing
No

Royal Philips
Electronics Inc.

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

University of
California, Office
of the General
Counsel

method of using gfruaino
matrix fourier
popoosadtcnlg
transformation
friie
o
nuclear magnetic
plnsdtriaonf
resonancethelsityo
spectroscopy for
rapid chemical
structuiriyeo
shift assignment
and secondary

Fish &
Richardson P.C.

mgn
eaigt

tsu

ehd
h
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Case No.

2:09cv290

1:09cv10396

1:09cv184

Date Filed

3/6/2009

3/13/2009

3/19/2009

Court

W.D. Pa.

D. Mass.

D. Del.

Carnegie Mellon
University

AsymmetRx, Inc.

The Research
Foundation of
State University
of New York

President and
Fellows of
Harvard College

New York
University;
Galderma
Laboratories Inc.;
Galderma
Laboratories, L.P.

Dako Denmark
A/S; Dako North
America, Inc.

Mylan
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Marvell Tech.
Group, Ltd.;
Marvell
Semiconductor,
Inc.

Patents
Alleged

2

2

2

License Type

no allegation of
practicing

exclusive

exclusive

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Seeks
SaagsYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?

No

K&L Gates LLP
Outside
Counsel
noise predictive
detection for
reach-channel
integrated circuit
Technology
devicespnm
Specific

Goodwin Procter
LLP

p6anioesntbtc
adteueo
thmtdigoe
acr
pott

Kirkland & Ellis
LLP

omrilysl
aOrcaudfr
ce
tetn
otherathing
iaad
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Case No.

1:09cv310

1:09cv215

3:09cv1587

Date Filed

3/30/2009

4/1/2009

4/2/2009

Court

D. N.M.

D. Del.

D. N.J.

Abbott
Laboratories

Abbott
Laboratories

Wisconsin Alumni
Research
Foundation

Wisconsin Alumni
Research
Foundation

Sandoz, Inc.;
Sandoz GmbH

Sandoz, Inc.;
Sandoz GmbH

The Science and
Technology
Corporation of the
Lead
PladtUniversity
of New
Plaintiff
Mexico

CoPlaintiff(s)

Toshiba America
Elecs.
Components, Inc.;
Toshiba Corp.
Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

1

2

2

License Type

no allegation of
practicing

exclusive

exclusive

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Seeks
SaagsYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?

No

Stadheim &
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

Grear, Ltd.

method and
apparatus for
extending spatial
frequencies in
photolithography
images

Patterson
Belknap Webb &
Tyler LLP

Patterson
Belknap Webb &
Tyler LLP

vitamin D
compounds used
in treating
hyperparathyroidi
s, sold
commercially as
Zemplar

vitamin D
compounds used
in treating
hyperparathyroidi
s, sold
commercially as
Zemplar

[10:623 2011]

University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation
Appendix A

677

Case No.

2:09cv302

4:09cv3075

1:09cv272

Date Filed

4/7/2009

4/20/2009

4/22/2009

Court

D. Utah

D. Neb.

D. Del.

Brigham Young
University

Board of Regents
of the University
of Nebraska

Eli Lilly & Co.

Torion
Technologies, Inc.

UneMed Corp.

The Trustees of
Princeton
University

Hitachi High
Technologies
America, Inc.

Siemens
Healthcare
Diagnostics, Inc.

Barr Laboratories,
Inc.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

1

2

1

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

exclusive

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Seeks
DeesYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?

No

Morriss O'Bryant
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

Compagni, P.C.

electron ionization
source for
othogonal
acceleration time of-flight mass
spectrometry

Leydig, Voit &
Mayer, Ltd.

Williams &
Connolly LLP

method for
automatic testing
of laboratory
specimens

glutamic acid
derivatives used
in treating
mesothelioma or
nonsquamous
non-small cell
lung cancer, sold
commercially as
Alimta
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Case No.

1:09cv315

1:09cv312

1:09cv313

Date Filed

4/29/2009

4/29/2009

4/29/2009

Court

D. Del.

D. Del.

D. Del.

Pfizer Inc.

Pfizer Inc.

Pfizer Inc.

Warner-Lambert
Co. LLC; C.P.
Pharmaceuticals
Int'l C.V.;
Northwestern
University

Warner-Lambert
Co. LLC; C.P.
Pharmaceuticals
Int'l C.V.;
Northwestern
University

Warner-Lambert
Co. LLC; C.P.
Pharmaceuticals
Int'l C.V.;
Northwestern
University

Cobalt
Laboratories, Inc.;
Cobalt
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.

Wockhardt Ltd.;
Wockhardt USA,
LLC

Sun Pharma
Global Inc.; Sun
Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd.;
Sun
Pharmaceutical
Industries, Inc.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

2

1

1

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

exclusive

No

No

No

No

No

No

Marshall,
Gerstein & Borun
LLP

Marshall,
Gerstein & Borun
LLP

Seeks
D aesNo
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanNo
Demand?

No

Marshall,
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

Gerstein & Borun
LLP

gamamngmaaio
gamma amino
butyric acidbuyiacdbtrccd
analogs andanlganaaosad
opiaismr,
optical isomers,
branded as Lyrica
brneasLic

otclsme,
baddasyia
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Case No.

3:09cv2070

3:09cv2052

3:09cv2069

Date Filed

4/30/2009

4/30/2009

4/30/2009

Court

D. N.J.

D. N.J.

D. N.J.

Pfizer Inc.

Pfizer Inc.

Pfizer Inc.

Warner-Lambert
Co. LLC; C.P.
Pharmaceuticals
Int'l C.V.;
Northwestern
University

Warner-Lambert
Co. LLC; C.P.
Pharmaceuticals
Int'l C.V.;
Northwestern
University

Warner-Lambert
Co. LLC; C.P.
Pharmaceuticals
Int'l C.V.;
Northwestern
University

Sun Pharma
Global Inc.; Sun
Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd.;
Sun
Pharmaceutical
Industries, Inc.

Sandoz Inc.

Wockhardt Ltd.;
Wockhardt USA,
LLC

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

1

2

1

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

exclusive

No

No

No

No

No

No

Seeks
D aesNo
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanNo
Demand?

No

Marshall,
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

Gerstein & Borun
LLP

Marshall,
Gerstein & Borun
LLP

gamamngmaaio
gamma amino
butyric acidbuyiacdbtrccd
analogs andanlganaaosad
opiaismr,
optical isomers,
branded as Lyrica
brneasLic

Marshall,
Gerstein & Borun
LLP

otclsme,
baddasyia
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Case No.

3:09cv266

1:09cv10832

3:09cv99

Date Filed

4/30/2009

5/19/2009

6/22/2009

Court

W.D. Wisc.

D. Mass.

S.D. Iowa

Sirona Dental
Systems, Inc.

E8
Pharmaceuticals
LLC

The University of
Iowa

California
Institute of
Technology

Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology

University of Iowa
Research
Foundation

Palodex Group
Oy;
Instrumentarium
Dental, Inc.

Navigenics, Inc.

The Abbott
Laboratories;
Abbott Biosearch
Center, Inc.;
Abbott
Biotechnology
Ltd.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

4

1

2

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

non-exclusive

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Seeks
DeesYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

No

Shore Chan
Bragalone LLP

Wiley Rein LLP

Ballard Spahr
Andrews &
Ingersoll, LLP

digital intraoral
sensor using
complementary
metal oxide
semiconductor

method for
performing gentic
analysis using a
small sample of
DNA and a small
number of
reactants

CMV promoter,
used to promote
the expression of
genes and
production of
proteins for
production of
protein-based
drugs
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Case No.

1:09cv483

3:09cv694

5:09cv624

Date Filed

7/2/2009

7/23/2009

8/3/2009

Court

D. Del.

M.D. Ala.

W.D. Tex.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

The Research
Foundation of
State University
of New York

Auburn
University

New York
University;
Galderma
Laboratories Inc.;
Galderma
Laboratories, L.P.

Lupin Ltd.; Lupin
Pharms., Inc.

Board of Regents
of the University
of Texas System

Radworks Corp.

International
Business
Machines, Corp.

Sirona Dental
Systems, Inc.;
John Does 1 - 10

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

2

2

1

License Type

exclusive

no allegation of
practicing

exclusive

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Seeks
DeesNo
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanNo
Demand?

No

Kirkland & Ellis
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

LLP

antibiotic
commercially sold
as Oracea used for
treating acne,
pnemonia, and
other things

Fish &
Richardson P.C.

Gunn, Lee &
Cave, P.C.

methods for
rdorp
estimating
dslysse
reliability ofsectnditzd
integrated circuits
strdiae

o
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Case No.

7:09cv7114

2:09cv3947

Date Filed

8/12/2009

8/28/2009

Court

S.D. N.Y.

E.D. Pa.

LG Electronics, Inc.*

rJ.

BioTechnology,
LLC

Lead
Plaintiff

CD

0

CD

Mitsubishi Electric Corp.;
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.;
The Trustees of Columbia
University in the City of New
York; U.S. Philips Corp.;
Koninklijke Philips Electronics,
N.V.

CoPlaintiff(s)

Drexel University
(involuntary
plaintiff)

0D

4J7

0D
O

0

Haier America Trading, LLC;
Haier Group Co.; HAIM LLC

CIBA Vision Corp.

CD
01

-40

Defendant(s)

O

2

License Type

cJ72

4

0

no allegation of
pactino
practicing
Yes

no allegation of practicing

Seeks SeeksYes
Damages?
Strategic
No
Venue?
Jury
DemndYes
Demand?
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

No
Yes
Shore Chan
Bragalone LLP

Outside
Counsel

u CD

.f)

world-wide video compression
standard known as MPEG-2

methods of
making
biocompatible
surface modified
materials

Specific
Technology

I

_

_

0

4

Patents
Alleged

_

I

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

ct
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Case No.

1:09cv7828

1:09cv703

1:09cv5345

Date Filed

9/11/2009

9/18/2009

10/19/2009

Court

S.D. N.Y.

D. Del.

D. N.J.

Shotspotter, Inc.

The Research
Foundation of
State University
of New York

Bayer Healthcare
LLC

The Johns
Hopkins
University

New York
University;
Galderma
Laboratories Inc.;
Galderma
Laboratories, L.P.

New Ace Research
Co.; University of
Kentucky
Research
Foundation

Safety Dynamics,
Inc.

Impax
Laboratories, Inc.

Wedgewood
Village Pharmacy,
Inc.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

2

2

1

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

exclusive

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Seeks
DeesYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?

Yes

Satterlee
Outside
Counsel

Stephens Burke &
Burke LLP

gun shot digital
imaging used in
law enforcement
Specific
TechnologyotethnsMeocpais

Kirkland & Ellis
LLP

Woodcock
Washburn LLP

aniitcueotrzncomrilysd
a
rcaue
o
treating acne,
pnemonia, and

baeanocdast
orpentEue
inhsesni
Prtza

ra
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Case No.

1:09cv6957

1:09cv884

4:09cv114

Date Filed

11/5/2009

11/19/2009

11/25/2009

Court

N.D. Ill.

D. Del.

E.D. Tex.

Armin Rudd d/b/a
ABT Systems,
Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Abbott
Laboratories

LLC

The University of
Central Florida
Board of Trustees
on behalf of the
University of
Central Florida

Wisconsin Alumni
Research
Foundation

Lux Products
Corp.; Emerson
Climate Techs.;
Braeburn
Systems, LLC;
Lennox Int'l Inc.

Teva Parenteral
Medicines, Inc.;
Teva
Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc.; Teva
Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd.

Rutgers, the State
University of New
Jersey

A&A Nursery;
Maple Bend
Nursery; Bob
Young's Nursery

Patents
Alleged

3

3

1

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

no allegation of
practicing

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Seeks
DeesYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

No

Michael Mazza,

Finnegan

LLC

Henderson

thermostats that
utilize a fan
recycling control

vitamin D
compounds used
in treating
hyperparathyroidi
sm & sold
commercially as
Zemplar

Stadheim &
Grear, Ltd.

dogwood tree
stellar pink

-
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Case No.

1:09cv916

5:10cv54

5:10cv55

Date Filed

12/2/2009

1/22/2010

1/22/2010

Court

D. Del.

W.D. Tex.

W.D. Tex.

of Texas System

Board of Regents
of the University
of Texas System

Dupont Displays,
Inc.; The Regents
of the University
of California

Radworks Corp.

Radworks Corp.

Plextronincs, Inc.

Camsight Co.,
Inc.; John Does 1 10

MacPractice, Inc.;
MacPractice, LLC

Konarka
Technologies, Inc.
Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Board of Regents
of the University

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

1

1

1

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

exclusive

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Seeks
DeesYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?

No

Fish &
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

Richardson P.C.

conjugatedraigahrdoap
polymer-acceptor
heterojunctions;
diodes,strdiaestrdmgs
photodiodes, and
photovoltaic cells

Gunn, Lee &
Cave, P.C.

Gunn, Lee &
Cave, P.C.

dipasytmfr
seetndiiie

dslyytefo
seeigdgtzd
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Case No.

1:10cv84

1:10cv94

1:10cv1798

Date Filed

2/2/2010

2/4/2010

3/5/2010

Court

D. Del.

D. N.M.

S.D. N.Y.

Carl Zeiss
Meditec, Inc.
Lead
Plaintiff

STC.UNM f/k/a
Science &
Technology Corp.

Gilead Sciencees,
Inc.

@UNM

University of
Miami

Emory University

CoPlaintiff(s)

Optovue, Inc.

Environmental
Robots, Inc.

Defendant(s)

Teva
Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc.; Teva
Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd.

Patents
Alleged

2

1

2

License Type

exclusive

non-exclusive

exclusive

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Seeks
SaagsYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?

No

Fish &
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

Richardson P.C.

optical coherence
tomography for
anatomical
mapping used in
ophthalmic
diagnostic
technologies

Stadheim &
Grear, Ltd.

cutr
sf
atfca

n
uce

Fitzpatrick, Cella,
Harper & Scinto

I-1du
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1:10cv204

1:10cv288

Date Filed

3/12/2010

4/9/2010

Court

D. Del.

D. Del.

Pfizer Inc.

Sirona Dental Systems,
Inc.

Warner-Lambert Co.
LLC; C.P.
Pharmaceuticals Int'l
C.V.; Northwestern
University

California Institute of
Technology

Alphapharm Pty. Ltd.;
Mylan Pharms., Inc.

Cefla S.C.; Cefla
Capital Services, S.p.A.;
Cefla Dental Group
America, Inc.; Danaher
Corp.; DEXIS LLC;
Planmeca Oy;
PLANMECA U.S.A.
Inc.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

1

4

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

Seeks SeksNo
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury JuryNo
Demand?
Outside
Counsel

Yes
No

No
Yes

Marshall, Gerstein &
Borun LLP

Fitzpatrick, Cella,
Harper & Scinto

gamma amino butyric
acid analogs and optical
isomers, branded as
Lyrica

caeadveswt
imgseoruedn
dna aigah

Specific
Technology

I

_

_

_

I

_

_

_

_

_

I

_

_

_

_

_
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Case No.

3:10cv2079

1:10cv433

2:10cv1050

Date Filed

5/17/2010

5/24/2010

6/24/2010

Court

N.D. Cal.

D. Del.

W.D. Wa.

Caliper Life
Sciences, Inc.

Cornell University

Xenogen Corp.;
Board of Trustees
of the Leland
Stanford Junior
University

Cornell Research
Foundation, Inc.;
Life Technologies
Corp.; Applied
Biosystems, LLC

Carestream
Health, Inc.

Illumina, Inc.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Washington
Research
Foundation

Silicon
Laboratories Inc.

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

7

8

2

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

exclusive

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Seeks
DeesYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?

Yes

Howrey LLP
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

Parsons Behle &
Latimer

non-invasive in
poyeaecan
vivo optical
rato
ehd
ue ngntc
imaging useful in
identifyinganlsstcoog
diseases at early(Butoh
sae

Blank Law &
Technology P.S.

lwitrdae
rqec
feunyrcie

ai
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Case No.

1:10cv11176

1:10cv681

3:10cv4837

Date Filed

7/14/2010

9/8/2010

9/20/2010

Court

D. Mass.

M.D. N.C.

D. N.J.

Metabolix, Inc.

Allergan, Inc.

Schering-Plough
Healthcare
Products, Inc.

University of
Massachusetts

Duke University

Santarus, Inc.;
The Curators of
the University of
Missouri

International
Paper Co.

Apotex Inc.;
Apotex Corp.

Par
Pharmaceutical,
Inc.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

1

3

4

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

exclusive

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Seeks
DeesYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanYes
Demand?

No

Fish &
Outside
Counsel

Richardson P.C.
acting as special
ass't AG
polyactic acidbased blends

Specific
Technology

Gibson Dunn &
Crutcher

Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP

hypotrichosis
treatment
(eyelash
regrowth), sold
commercially as
Latisse

substituted
benzimidazole
dosage forms, sold
commercially as
Zegerid OTC
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Case No.

3:33av1

1:10cv853

3:10cv2127

Date Filed

9/20/2010

10/6/2010

10/12/2010

Court

D. N.J.

D. Del.

S.D. Cal.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Schering-Plough
Healthcare
Products, Inc.

Pfizer Inc.

Life Technologies
Corp.

Santarus, Inc.;
The Curators of
the University of
Missouri

Warner-Lambert
Co. LLC; C.P.
Pharmaceuticals
Int'l C.V.;
Northwestern
University

Molecular Probes,
Inc.; The Regents
of the University
of California

Perrigo Co.;
Perrigo Research
and Development
Co.

Lupin Ltd.; Lupin
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.

Ebioscience Inc.

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

4

2

3

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

exclusive

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart &
Sullivan, LLP

Marshall,
Gerstein & Borun
LLP

Parsons Behle &
Latimer

substituted
benzimidazole
dosage forms, sold
commercially as
Zegerid OTC

gamma amino
butyric acid
analogs and
optical isomers,
branded as Lyrica

organo
luminescent
semiconductor
nanocrystal
probes for
biological
applications and
process for
making and using

Seeks
SaagsNo
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanNo
Demand?
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

I_

No

I__I_

_Isuch

probes
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Case No.

1:10cv912

1:10cv11921

2:10cv5956

Date Filed

10/25/2010

11/9/2010

11/15/2010

Court

D. Del.

D. Mass.

D. N.J.

Abbott
Laboratories

Akamai
Technologies, Inc.

United States of
America

Wisconsin Alumni
Research
Foundation

Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology

Board of Trustees
of the University
of Illinois

Anchen
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.; Anchen Inc.

Cotendo, Inc.

Mylan
Pharmaceuticals
Inc.; Lupin
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.; Lupin Ltd.

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

1

1

1

License Type

exclusive

exclusive

non-exclusive

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Seeks
DeesNo
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
DeanNo
Demand?

No

Finnegan,
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

Henderson,
Farabow, Garrett
& Dunner, LLP

Choate, Hall &
Stewart

vitamin D
content delivery
services over the
compounds used
in treating
Internetsodcmeial
hyperparathyroidiasPeit
s, sold
commercially as
Zemplar

Jones Day

dauvi
etaoteabts
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Case No.

1:10cv1077

1:10cv998

Date Filed

11/15/2010

11/19/2010

Court

D. N.M.

D. Del.

STC.UNM

Abbott Laboratories

Lead
Plaintiff

Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation
CoPlaintiff(s)

Intel Corp.

Roxane Laboratories,
Inc.

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

1

1

License Type

no allegation of
practicing

exclusive

SeeksSeksYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
JuryJuryNo
Demand?

No
No

Yes
No

Stadheim &
Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

I

_

_

_

I

Grear, Ltd.

Finnegan,
Henderson, Farabow,
Garrett & Dunner,
LLP

method and
apparatus for
extending spatial
frequencies in
photolithography
images

vitamin D
compounds used in
treating
hyperparathyroidis,
sold commercially as
Zemplar

_

_

_

_

I

_

_

_

_
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Case No.

2:10cv9099

Date Filed

11/24/2010

Court

C.D. Cal.
California Institute of Technology

Lead
Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

STMicroelectronics NV; STMicroelectronics,
Inc.; SETi Co., Ltd.; Siliconfile Technologies,
Inc.; Toshiba Corp.; Toshiba America
Electronic Components, Inc.; LG Electronics,
Inc.; LG Electronics Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc.;
LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.; Nokia Corp.;
Nokia, Inc.; Pantech Co., Ltd.; Pantech
Wireless, Inc.

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

9

License Type

no allegation of practicing

Seeks
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?
Jury
Demand?

No

Shore Chan Bragalone LLP
Outside
Counsel
CMOS active pixel sensor technology

Specific
Technology

I

_

_

_

I

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_
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Case No.

2:10cv1933

1:10cv12225

Date Filed

11/30/2010

12/23/2010

Court

W.D. Wa.

D. Mass.

University of
Washington

Massachusetts
Institute of
Technology

Lead

Plaintiff

CoPlaintiff(s)

The General
Electric Co.; GE
Healthcare, Inc.

Still River
Systems, Inc.

Defendant(s)

Patents
Alleged

1

3

License Type

no allegation of
practicing

exclusive

SeeksSeksYes
Damages?
Strategic
Venue?

Yes
No

No

Jury
DeanYes
Demand?

Yes
Perkins Coie LLP

LLP

Outside
Counsel

Specific
Technology

I _____

Proskauer Rose

apparatus and
method for
interactive 3D
registration of
ultrasound and
magnetic
resonance images
based on a
magnetic position
_IsensorII

magnet structure
for particle
acceleration and
high-field
superconducting
synchrocyclotron

694

